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The Effects of Strategy Training and Text Organization on Mental Models of  
Natural Causal Complex Systems 
Cathy Jalali 
 
In the absence of direct experience with physical stimuli, people generate mental models to 
facilitate cognitive processes involved in problem solving.  Mental models are viewed as internal 
representations that help people understand, reason about, predict and investigate causal and functional 
relationships contained within physical systems.  In addition, more recent findings distinguish mental 
models from other mental representations by suggesting that people actively construct mental models, 
switch between different mental models of a given problem, and alternate between mental models and 
rules to solve problems. Piecemeal animation of a system’s action has been identified as the cognitive 
strategy people use to reason about dynamic physical systems. Emphasizing function over form in 
multimedia presentations about physical systems has been shown to improve the leaners’ mental models. 
Novice leaners’ mental models are reported to emphasize structure, while the experts’ mental models 
include more functional and behavioral elements. Mental models of causal complex systems that operate 
in perceptually novel environments remain largely unstudied.  
Two experiments were conducted to study peoples’ mental models of single and functionally 
coupled causal complex systems and investigate the influences of text organization and strategy training 
on novice learners’ mental model development. A modified version of the Structure Behavior Function 
(SBF) framework was developed to facilitate the investigation of mental models of causal complex 
systems. Results suggest that in the absence of explicit instruction, people utilize a combination of 
cognitive strategies ranging from rote memorization to piecemeal simulation of the systems’ functions to 
form incomplete, but coherent mental models of causal complex systems from text and static diagrams. A 
brief training session was effective in teaching novice learners to use envisioning strategy and help 
promote piecemeal animation of the system. Envisioning strategy training significantly improved the 





components involved in achieving the systems’ overall functions in both single and functionally coupled 
causal complex systems (p<0.05).   
For the single causal complex system (CCS), function-salient text improved subjects’ structure 
and function subscores significantly (p<0.05), but did not affect the mechanism subscore. The interaction 
between text and strategy training was not significant. For the functionally coupled causal complex 
system (FC-CCS), text was not a significant predictor of mental model complexity or its subcomponents. 
The interaction between text and strategy training was also insignificant. 
Though subjects’ mental models included more structural than functional elements for both CCS 
and FC-CCS, majority demonstrated understanding of the overall systems’ functions (formation of end 
products). The subjects appeared to pay selective attention to the change producing steps and points of 
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW 
 
The mental model theory posits that people form internal representations of the external world 
objects and situations and in the absence of direct experience use these representations to reason about 
and predict possible outcomes, behaviors, and functions. If the formation of these internal representations 
is contingent upon experience, how do people form internal representations of objects, environments and 
situations with which they have little to no perceptual experience? In addition, how do people form mental 
models of complexity (organize information about a novel and complex stimulus) when they first 
encounter it? 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of the theories that frame the studies described in this 
document, including the mental model theory, Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning, and Envisioning 
Theory. 
Chapter 3 discusses a preliminary study designed to gain insight about mental models of causal 
complex systems commonly encountered at the cellular level in living systems. The DNA replication 
machinery was used as the single causal complex system, while the RNA transcription and protein 
translation machineries were used to depict functionallycoupled causal complex systems.  The Structure, 
Behavior, Function (SBF) framework commonly used to study complex systems appeared to be an 
inadequate tool in comprehensively capturing the complexity seen in these cellular systems. Chapter 4 
discusses the need for and development of a modified scoring framework (Structure, function, 
Mechanism, and Function (SfMF)), which was successfully applied in the two experiments discussed in 
later chapters to aid with conceptualizing mental models of causal complex natural systems. The findings 
from the preliminary study also suggested that when learning about highly complex system, people use 
their understanding of the overall complex systems’ functions to attend to structural and behavioral details 
that comprise the causal complex systems.  This novel finding prompted the design of two separate 
studies to investigate the influences of envisioning training and text organization on cellular causal 
complex system mental model development in the context of increasing complexity. These studies have 
been described in detail in chapters 5 and 6.   





1. Provide evidence that given a brief exposure to static diagrams and text, people can form 
incomplete, but coherent mental models of highly complex linear systems with which they have 
little or no prior perceptual experience. 
 
2. Provide a modified version of the SBF framework accounting for the process (mechanism) used 
in each system to achieve the end product. The Structure function Mechanism Function (SfMF) 
framework was effectively applied to investigate various components of mental models of highly 
complex linear systems.  
 
3. Provide evidence that people use a variety of cognitive strategies to develop mental models of 
highly complex linear systems ranging between rehearsing reconstructed diagrams and text in 
their own notes and mentally animating/ simulating the systems’ functions.  
 
4. Provide evidence that the envisioning (mental stimulation) strategy can be taught to novice 
subjects using relatively little effort and results in a statistically significant enhancement of the 
causal complex systems’ mental models.  
 
5. Provide further supporting evidence that modifying the instructional media to emphasize function 
over form can positively influence development of mental models of highly complex linear 
systems by potentially reducing the cognitive load intrinsic to learning about complex systems. 
 
6. Provide evidence that selective attention to structures and steps that are critical to the overall 
function of the system appears to be the default mechanism people use to cope with the cognitive 
load experienced when learning about highly complex linear systems, leading to the development 







CHAPTER 2: MENTAL MODELS OF CAUSAL COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
The origin of the concept of mental models is generally attributed to Craik (1943) who first 
theorized about internal representations of the external world. Since Craik, several lines of inquiry have 
provided evidence that people actively use and refine mental models to learn and reason about logical, 
spatial, temporal, and causal relationships.  This chapter discusses different types of mental models, and 
provides an overview of how people form mental models and factors that influence mental model 
development. Finally, mental models of causal complex systems commonly encountered in scientific 
reasoning is reviewed and gaps in our current understanding of such mental models are identified.   
Mental Models 
Types of Mental Models 
Markman and Gentner (2001) have distinguished between two major categories of mental 
models, logical and causal. The elements in logical mental models are limited to symbols that help 
construct models of situations active in short term memory (language based (symbolic) models). The 
elements in causal mental models, however, represent structures within systems, reasoning about which 
requires incorporation of prior knowledge from long term memory. These models are symbolic as well as 
iconic (image-based) in nature (Johnson-Laird, 2001).  
Logical Mental Models. When performing propositional reasoning with conditional, conjunctive 
or disjunctive statements, people construct mental models of specific situations to which the propositions 
correspond (Johnson-Laird, Byrne, and Schaeken, 1992).  Multiple mental models may be possible for 
given situations, with each model representing a single possibility (Johnson-Laird, 2001). In such cases, 
people make multiple mental models corresponding to the different possibilities (Johnson-Laird, 2004). 
People can also form mental models of relations contained within relational statements (Goodwin & 
Johnson-Laird, 2005).  The fewer the arguments people have to consider to establish the relationship(s) 
between elements, the more accurate the mental models they make of relations.  People form mental 
models of spatial relationships by fitting entities in a linear arrangement conducive to formation of singular 
models (Jahn, Knauff, & Johnson-Laird, 2007). Sentences that can readily be integrated into previously 
established mental models take less time to read and are more accurately processed than information 





form mental models of perceptual relationships (i.e. taller/shorter) more readily than relations between 
abstract concepts (i.e. smarter). Increasing depth in relation between two arguments compromises the 
accuracy of mental models. Secondary relationships are easier to reason about than tertiary relationships 
between arguments and concepts.  People appear to process information in the very order in which the 
premises are presented. The more alternative models information about a situation can yield, the more 
errors people make in predicting outcomes of the situation.  When either mental model or rule-based 
derivation works as reasoning strategies to predict outcome, differential error rates and reading times 
suggest that people prefer mental models to rule-derived reasoning (Schaeken, Johnson-Laird, & 
d'Ydewalle, 1996).  
Causal Mental Models. When reasoning about physical systems and causal phenomena in the 
absence of direct experience, people appear to generate multiple internal representations of systems (i.e. 
analogies, naïve theories, depictive models, and mental simulation/animation), allowing the individuals to 
virtually interact with the system or phenomena to understand and predict behaviors and outcomes 
(Collins & Gentner, 1987; Hegarty, 1992; Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Schwartz & Black, 1996a; Schwartz 
& Black, 1996b). Gentner (2002) distinguishes mental models from other forms of mental representations 
(i.e.: scripts, schemas) as models that focus on qualitative relationships between systems’ components, 
conducive to performing mental simulation.  de Kleer and Brown (1982) have proposed that when 
reasoning about causal systems, people use the process of envisioning by which they run or simulate 
qualitative and causal relationships contained within the system in their mind’s eyes to predict the 
systems’ behavior. People can hold and utilize two or more (inconsistent) mental models of the same 
systems/events (Collins & Gentner, 1987; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994; Chi, de 
Leeuw, Chiu, & La Vancher, 1994).   
Analogical Reasoning 
Analogies provide additional insight about various ways people construct mental models of novel 
situations (Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Whitely, 1997; Collins & Gentner, 1987; Clement, 1988).  
They are believed to promote activation of prior knowledge and provide opportunity for transfer across 
domains. History of scientific discoveries and technological innovations is rife with examples of analogy-





superimposing causal relationships of a familiar (base) system onto the novel (target) system 
independently of domain and structural similarities between the base and target systems’ components 
(Gentner, 1989).   
People can be instructed to use analogies as problem solving strategies. Novice students of 
physics, who were provided with two separate analogies about electricity- water moving through the pipe 
(voltage as water pressure which meets resistance from the pipe), or a person making his way through a 
teeming crowd (current (flow of charge) meeting resistance from the bodies in the crowd)- seemed to hold 
the two different models of electricity simultaneously and switched between the two as a function of the 
specific variable stressed in the physics problem to be solved (Gentner & Gentner, 1983).  Problems 
involving resistors were solved more readily using the teeming crowd analogy, while problems involving 
batteries were solved more readily using the water flow in a pipe analogy. This observation showed that 
problem type affects people’s analogy choices about the same physical concept. Similarly, when 
reasoning about the impact of population growth on life resources, people’s attitudes towards the problem 
affected their choice of they used to solve the problem of limited resources (Gentner & Whitely, 1997).   
Other studies have shown that novice physics students held and used at least three different mental 
models of water evaporation (Collins & Gentner, 1987).  Students’ explanations for evaporation of water 
from a wet towel or a puddle (physically identical events) were drastically different in nature, consistency 
and accuracy based on their choice of mental model. 
When expert physicists were given the freedom to choose the approach by which to solve 
physics problems, the majority generated spontaneous analogies (Clement, 1988). The following were 
common properties reported in the expert analogical reasoning: 1) they used general principles that  were 
known to be applicable in several domains (i.e. conservation of energy); 2) they made deliberate 
associations (i.e. when reasoning about a spring, asking themselves: “what else stretches?”) ; and 3) they 
transformed current models by modifying seemingly fixed attributes to search one’s prior knowledge for 
similar situations (i.e. uncoiling a spring into a wire, and predicting the behavior of a wire first). Combining 
principles with models of familiar systems make these analogy-based mental models both symbolic and 





Some studies have reported analogies based on semantic networks independently of imagistic 
models (Gick and Holyoake, 1980).  After a reading exercise subjects were able to map similarities in 
verbs used to describe two problems in which disintegrating and reintegrating the number of people in an 
army was analogous to disintegrating/reintegrating the amount of radiation (rays) to regulate strength of 
radiation.  Though not reported in the original study, it is possible that many people who mapped the army 
example onto the radiation example may indeed have visualized the radiation rays and the army grow 
smaller/larger in size (used imagistic models). While analogical thinking may promote efficient mental 
models in some individuals, not all individuals are capable of generating analogies spontaneously and 
adequately. The quality (functional utility) of analogies developed by different individuals varies as a 
function of their selective attention to structures v. causal relations contained within the system.  Those 
who find the structural attributes more relevant than causal relations are more likely to generate 
inconsistent models of systems’ behaviors based on superficial analogies.   
Naïve Theories 
 
In the early stages of development, people’s mental models of natural phenomena can be 
characterized as naïve theories.  Vosniadou and Brewer (1992; 1994) assessed the effectiveness of 
elementary school age children’s mental models in answering questions about introductory concepts in 
astronomy.  While majority of the children correctly drew a circle to identify the planet as round, many 
appeared unable to effectively reason about the planet’s behavior as a function of its shape. For example, 
many children reported believing the existence of “an end” or “an edge” to the earth and exhibited 
difficulty with explaining how people lived on a flat surface on an otherwise round structure. To reconcile 
the contradictions, the subjects modified their initial drawings or generated concurrent alternative models 
with different properties.  Similar findings were reported about children’s mental models of day and night 
cycles. The children’s mental models progressed from naïve models (younger children) to more synthetic 
models (older children). Upon completion of elementary school years, most children were reported to 
have reached the scientific model of day/ night cycle explanation.  The improvement in the ability to 
synthesize (while making the necessary modifications) internal representations that allow people as 
young as elementary school children to reason about the external world resembles to the progressive 





College students’ naïve theories of physical phenomena have also been reported in estimating 
that objects launched from curved paths would continue to experience curvilinear motion, even in the 
absence of any external force (McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980).  This reported misconception 
was found to be less prevalent in college students who had received formal instruction about principles of 
physics. In addition to misconceptions, Clement (1982) has identified errors in pre-conceptions of physical 
phenomena. In learning about the relationship between force and acceleration, many college students 
erroneously believed that motion of objects at constant velocity implied existence of external forces. 
Clement has elaborated on the similarities between the students’ naive reasoning and Galileo’s early 
writings about reconciling the force vectors of different directions that result in the final direction of motion. 
The fragmented view of information implies that common experiences are abstracted as primitive 
phenomenological units (p-prims), which can combine to inform learning about complex scientific models 
(diSessa, 1988). Faulty abstractions can result in and perpetuate misconceptions. Naïve theories and p-
prims impose additional challenges on developing accurate mental models when learning about scientific 
systems, some of which are described in more detail in later sections of this document.  
Models by Inference 
People draw upon their knowledge of schemas and form mental models of narrative texts by 
making inferences about events and situations (Kintsch and van Dijk, 1978; Graesser, Singer, & 
Trabasso, 1994). While simple propositional models can aid recall and logical reasoning, effective 
inference making seems to rely on making mental models of the specific situations (Perrig and Kintsch, 
1985). People appear to use a combination of their world knowledge and cues in the text to develop 
mental models of the most likely interpretations of situations expressed in texts, limited to only agents and 
events essential to the said interpretation (Garnham, 1981). While reading, people maintain both local 
(text-based) and global (situation-based) coherence (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; Myers, Albrecht, & 
O’Brien, 1994). Differences in reading times suggest that people identify inconsistencies in local texts as 
well as inconsistencies in expected behaviors and events based on earlier sentences. Compound 
sentences with inconsistencies in point of view are perceived by subjects to be more difficult to process, 
take longer to read, and are less frequently recalled when compared to compound sentences in which the 





inconsistencies in point of view, they transformed verbs of motion from directional to more neutral or more 
consistent ones to compensate for the difficulty in mental model development caused by the point of view 
inconsistencies. 
Depictive (Imagistic) Models 
People can form mental models of simple physical systems and simulate their actions from mere 
static diagrams (Hegarty, 1992; Schwartz & Black, 1996a). Given static diagrams of pulley systems, 
college-age subjects have successfully verified direction of motion and inferred system outcomes by 
mentally animating the systems’ behaviors.  Diagrams of simple interlocking gears of varying sizes and 
spatial attributes promoted utilization of different problem solving strategies. The more abstract depictions 
prompted the subjects to use analytical solutions (i.e. considerations of gear size ratios) in determining 
the overall direction of the systems’ movement.  In contrast, depictions closer to the real-life appearance 
of interlocking gears promoted transformations of gear systems’ analog images, within which, distinct 
strategies (independent of variability in individuals’ spatial ability) were used.  Using kinematic mental 
models, which made the systems’ spatial attributes more salient, the participants used global analog 
strategies (spatial and mathematical reasoning) to solve problems.  In contrast, dynamic mental models 
stimulated more local analog (imagery-based) solutions, in which the individuals actually imagined how 
the force/action generated by one gear made the other move.   
People alternate between mental models and rules to optimize problem solving (Schwartz & 
Black, 1996b).  Response latency results indicated that when individuals were faced with novel problems 
(odd/even numbers of gears in the chain as well as closed and open chains of gears), they used depictive 
mental models (mental animation of two-dimensional diagrams) to understand and predict the systems’ 
behaviors.  After typically three problems of the same kind, individuals appeared to discover the rules that 
governed the systems, and used rules rather than imagistic models to solve problems.   As soon as the 
complexity of the system increased, or they encountered new types of problems, they once again 
switched to depictive models.   Consistent with previous studies mentioned in this section, the ability to 
shuttle between symbolic rules and imagistic models as a function of task difficulty and stimulus novelty 
implies that mental models can be used as strategies to reason about novel domains with which the 





Several studies have shown that people construct mental models effectively from a combination 
of diagrams and text when compared to either diagrams and or text alone (Hegarty, 1992; Hegarty & Just, 
1993; Hegarty, Just & Morrison, 1988; Mayer, 1989a; Mayer, Steinhoff, Bower, & Mars, 1995).  Eye 
fixation data has shown that individuals learning about simple pulley systems initially read the text 
incrementally and modified their mental representations by rereading the specific portions of the text and 
alternating between text and diagrams.  A combination of properly labeled illustrations and expository 
texts facilitated the development of efficient mental models of physical systems such as hydraulic breaks. 
The temporal nature of the linkage between visual and verbal cues was essential in fostering mental 
model development (Mayer & Sims, 1994). Concurrent presentations of text and diagrams led to more 
efficient mental models than the settings in which narrative texts preceded or followed the diagrams.   
Having established the utility of static diagrams in the development of mental models, many have 
questioned whether animated presentations can improve mental models above and beyond static 
images. To date, the evidence remains mixed (Tversky, Morrison, & Betrancourt, 2002). Lack of 
equivalency between the quality and amount of content presented in the animated and static media in 
most studies that have reported animated presentations superior to static images has made it challenging 
to make meaningful comparison between the two. Black (2007) has shown that as long as baseline 
information to form mental models was provided (i.e. a spatial floor plan of a complex building), no 
significant advantage was observed for the group that received animated version of the presentation 
compared to the one that received static pictures. When subjects were provided with comparable content 
in animation with narration or static diagrams and text to learn about physical processes (lightening 
formation and ocean waves) as well as physical systems (toilet tank and car break system), the ones who 
received static images retained significantly more information and performed significantly better on some 
of the transfer tasks, while no significant differences were reported between the two groups on the 
remaining tasks (Mayer, Hegarty, Mayer, & Campbell, 2005). A similar study which compared various 
instructional media (animated presentation, static image, a combination of animated presentation and 
static image, static image and a prompt to infer motion from static images) confirmed the finding that while 
both animated presentations and static images improved retention and transfer about mechanical 





This prompted the investigators to propose the Static Media Hypothesis which posits that static diagrams 
and text are superior to narrated animation as they lower the extraneous cognitive load and allow the 
learners to focus on the germane load through more active brain engagement (Sweller, 1994). 
Much like analogies, people can be taught to use imagery to form more effective mental models 
of physical systems (Leopold & Mayer, 2015). Novice subjects who were prompted to form images of 
texts about the human respiratory system (before, during, or after reading the text) significantly 
outperformed the controls (reading the text only) on tests of retention and transfer. Determining whether 
people can be taught to mentally animate images of such complex systems to form mental models 
conducive to better problem solving requires further study.   
Models of Causality 
To reason about causal systems, one must perform two distinct tasks: 1) explore the causal 
relationships between various structures in the system; and 2) explore how the causal relations culminate 
in the system’s overall actions. The Two-Stage Theory of mental model construction posits that people 
identify the structures within the system (component model) before constructing the model of the causal 
relationships between them (causal model) (Mayer & Cook, 1984; Mayer, Mathias, & Wetzell, 2002). 
When constructing mental models of causal systems from text, a focused search for nodes (system 
components) and relations  results in much more useful models for problem solving than attempting to 
learn all the information about the system at once.  In a series of experiments about a biological (nitrogen 
cycle) and physical (density) systems, modifying text to highlight relations (signaling) and or components 
(prior definition for entities or concepts) proved to be successful instructional strategies in enhancing the 
subjects’ conceptual learning, problem solving, and transfer. Factors that promoted development of 
component model before causal ones resulted in the development of more effective mental models.  Pre-
training subjects by introducing them to descriptions and depiction of individual components of a complex 
system (e.g. bicycle tire pump) improved their performance on tests of retention, near, and far transfer.  
Post-training, in which the learners used the depictions and descriptions to review materials they had just 
learned, however, did not improve retention or transfer. Together, these findings provide additional 





How do people form a causal model?  Eye fixation data has shown that when people were asked 
to reason about particular components of pulley systems from static diagrams, they focused on the very 
component in question, and the components preceding it but not the components following it (Hegarty, 
1992).  This suggested the existence of a piecemeal strategy to establishing causality.  Since the subjects 
also used the static diagrams to infer information about the outcome of the causal chains (internally 
representing the causality), Hegarty referred to this finding as the “piecemeal strategy of mental 
animation”.  Inconsistencies in the component model, or problems with integrating the components into 
the causal chain correctly may result in overall model inconsistencies that ultimately leads to robust 
misconceptions about physical phenomena and systems. 
de Kleer and Brown (1982) have further distinguished between the development of a causal 
model and running it in one’s mind to simulate the resultant actions (envisioning). In addition to 
constructing causal model, envisioning assumes that disturbances from equilibrium can be explained by 
examining how changes in the state of one component is propagated down the causal chain, resulting in 
changes in the subsequent components’ states. The system’s structures (component model) acts as the 
input for the envisioning process, which leads to the understanding of the system’s function (output). 
 
Individual Differences in Mental Model Developments 
Differences in standardized measures of spatial and mechanical ability have been reported to 
affect people’s mental models of physical systems. When learning about either a bicycle tire pump or 
human respiratory system from narrated or non-narrated animations, subjects with high spatial ability 
(paper folding test) who concurrently viewed the animation and listened to narration significantly 
outperformed the successive (listening to narration before or after viewing the animation) or control group 
(no narration) subjects (Mayer & Sims, 1994). The experimenters theorized that high spatial ability left 
more cognitive room for novice learners to shuttle between the visual and verbal stimuli. 
When learning about pulley systems of different mechanical advantage, college students used 
qualitative simulation and general rules (i.e. less weight per pulley requires less force to move the weight) 
to understand and navigate causal relationships between systems’ components (Hegarty, Just, & 





systems (different rules resulting in different ratios) compromised the subjects ‘ability to reason about the 
systems’ overall functions. This difficulty appeared to be correlated with the individuals’ mechanical ability 
(as measured by Bennett’s’ Test of Mechanical Ability). Compared to subjects with low ability, subjects 
with high mechanical ability focused on more relevant system attributes (i.e. mechanical advantage of 
pulley systems v. structural differences such as size of the pulleys), adhered to consistent rule use, and 
integrated quantitative information about the causal relations while qualitatively simulating them.   
The approach to organizing information that inform mental model development appears to be 
related to level of expertise. Gobbo and Chi (1986) reported that novice and expert children (based on 
measured prior knowledge of dinosaurs) took different approaches to organizing information about 
dinosaurs that “went together”. While the two groups uttered an equivalent amount of information about 
the dinosaurs, only expert children compared dinosaurs across habitat, family and social activity (more 
behavioral and causal features). In a similar study, when children were provided with pictures of novel 
dinosaurs, and asked to predict the dinosaurs’ defense mechanisms, eating habits, and environment, 
expert children made considerably more comparisons between dinosaurs than novice children, with the 
latter focusing more on superficial attributes (Chi, Hutchinson, & Robin, 1989). Another study has 
reported that experts and novices represent physics problems differently (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). 
Physics doctoral students and novice undergraduates were given problems on mechanics to sort. Not 
surprisingly, the experts took significantly less time to complete the task.  Novices focused on “surface 
structures” of the problems (i.e. the object (e.g. spring) used in the problem), while the experts 
categorized the problems on the basis of “principles governing” the problem type (laws of physics) and 
not the superficial features.  
 
Perceptual Underpinnings of Mental Models 
Reports of naïve theories and preconceptions described in previous sections provide the first 
clues that mental models develop as a function of perceptual experiences with the real world (McCloskey, 
Caramazza, & Green, 1980; Clement, 1982; diSessa, 1988). Given the iconic (image-based) and 
symbolic (language-based) elements of mental models, verbal and visual processing comprise the most 





visuospatial sketchpad and phonological loop components of working memory (Dual Coding Theory) has 
received considerable attention over the past few decades (Paivio, 1991; Baddeley, 1992). The theory 
posits that visual and verbal inputs are processed via two distinct channels with limited capacity. This 
limitation along with our limited attention span has been demonstrated to influence construction of mental 
models (Mayer, Heiser, & Lonn, 2001; Sweller, 1994). When subjects were provided with both spoken 
and written versions of the text in a narrated animation, they offered significantly fewer solutions on 
problem solving tasks when compared to the group that received only the written text and animation both 
on retention and transfer tasks. The researchers theorized that introducing both narration and text 
crowded the two channels (verbal, visual) involved in processing incoming information and/ or 
compromised the subjects’ attention necessary for meaningful interaction with and integration of 
information. Similarly, presentation of “seductive details” (interesting but less relevant facts) significantly 
compromised the subjects’ performance on both retention and transfer tasks. The reduced recall and 
solution generation rates were attributed to the potential activation of the subjects’ prior knowledge which 
interfered with construction of accurate, concise, and complete mental models. Multimedia learning refers 
to the processes involved in the development of internal representations that integrate information from 
both verbal and auditory channels (Mayer, 2005). Consistent with the Dual Coding Theory, efficient 
mental models are constructed when people integrate verbal and pictorial information effectively (Paivio, 
1991; Mayer & Sims, 1994).  
More recently, other sensory modalities have been implicated in the development of mental 
models. Activating the haptic channels through direct manipulation animation (DMA) has been shown to 
significantly improve understanding of causal as well as causal connections within systems when 
compared to the fixed screens used in system-controlled animations (Chan & Black, 2006). The findings 
led to Chan and Black’s proposal of the Format-support Hypothesis in which learners’ needs would best 
inform the presentation format to ensure access to the information in a way that is conducive to optimal 
development of mental models.  
Perceptual experience appears to be a more effective tool than abstract mental rules in predicting 
the changes in some kinematic models (Schwartz & Black, 1999).  When people were asked to close 





correctly predicted that the narrower container would require more tilting than the wide container. In 
contrast, reasoning about the angle before imagining tilting the glasses resulted in considerably high error 
rate in predicting the angle of tilt.  These findings support the concept of affordance (action possibilities) 
people know to exist in given environments from experience (Gibson, 1979).  They provide further 
evidence that people can simulate physical action in their mind’s eyes. 
The Perceptual Symbol Theory posits that multimodal experiences with the objects and states in 
the physical world transform into mental referents, which help simulate (at least partially) objects and 
states from memory in the absence of experience (Barsalou, Solomon, & Wu, 1999). Tucker and Ellis 
(2001; 2004) have shown that viewing an object or reading about it promotes simulations of actions 
associated with the object in the brain (i.e. grabbing the handle of a cup). Grounded Cognition theories 
highlight the importance of situated cognition (perception rooted in experience with real world contexts 
and situations), memory, and environment as an extension of our cognitive space (Wilson, 2002).  
Physical and biological systems that have informed the investigation of different aspects of mental model 
development to date are limited to systems and environments with which people have had ample 
perceptual experience and memory (e.g. toilet tanks, car breaks, the aquarium, the respiratory or 
cardiovascular system, etc.). Development of mental models of systems that operate in environments with 
which humans have little to no perceptual experience (i.e. environments that require special equipment 





MENTAL MODELS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
The studies reviewed in this document thus far have largely reported on real world situations and 
simple physical systems in which causality can be readily established between very few variables. This 
section reviews some of the findings on ways by which people learn and reason about complex systems. 
Complexity 
Halford, Wilson, and Phillips (1998) define complexity as “the number of related dimensions or 
sources of variation.” Considering Goodwin and Johnson-Laird’s work (2005) that showed increase in the 
number and depth of relationships compromise people’s ability to form effective logical mental models, 
this definition of complexity implies that the amount of complexity has the potential to influence mental 
model development and quality. Jacobson (2001) has defined complex systems as systems which: 1) are 
comprised of multiple elements; 2) have the potential to self-organize; and 3)  have the potential to 
regulate their internal environments as a function of  changes in the outside environment (adaptive 
systems). The gradual adaptation might indeed lead to development of evolutionary processes to 
facilitate the perpetual adaptation required for the system to survive.  As such, most complex systems are 
subject to emergent processes, which create challenges to cognition and conception (Chi, 2005). Such 
dynamic and adaptive systems usually create multiple levels of components and processes (macro 
(global) and micro (local) levels).   
Chi (2005) has distinguished between complexity in direct and emergent systems. Direct systems 
contain explicit causal relationships, whose specific temporal sequence result in the system’s function. 
For example, in the human circulatory system, blood circulates through specific structures of the 
cardiovascular system in a specific order, facilitated by the action of specific structures along its path. In 
contrast, emergent systems do not possess such sequential causality amongst systems’ components; 
instead the resulting phenomenon emerges as the function of an evolving interplay between system 
components that are structurally identical. For example, when dye molecules diffuse in water from the 
area of high to low concentration, they do so in no particular sequential order until all of the dye has 
dissolved in water. The mixture of dye and water (the product) is achieved not through causal and direct 
relationships, but through emergent interactions between the dye and water molecules (all dye and water 





emergence or high number of causal relationships might challenge the novice learners to the point of 
creating misconceptions by incorrectly attributing causality when no direct cause can be identified.  
Levels. Dynamic and adaptive systems include multiple levels of components and processes 
(Jacobson, 2001). Levels of complexity can manifest in several ways. Hierarchically, water molecules 
make ocean waves. Still, the movement of waves does not result from the movement of individual water 
molecules, but from the movement of energy between molecules. In other words, while structurally, whole 
(wave) is the sum of the parts (water molecules), whole behaves differently that the parts.  Time may be 
split and clumped in a progression from lower to higher levels (seconds, minutes, days, weeks, years). On 
this spectrum, lower levels (i.e. seconds, minutes) serve as building blocks for higher levels (weeks, 
years). In other hierarchical complex systems such as the army, lower level constituents (i.e. sergeant) do 
not serve as building blocks for higher levels of organization (i.e. general). Wilensky & Resnick (1999) 
have hypothesized that “slippage” between levels of multi-leveled complex systems contributes to the 
development of misconceptions. 
Interactions between lower level constituents (i.e. cars) result in the emergence of higher level 
phenomena (i.e. traffic jams). Mental models of such emergent behavior are difficult to construct. When 
Wilensky and Resnick (1999) provided high school students as well as MIT researcher with a 
programming platform to investigate the idea of levels by programming to simulate the behavior of slime 
mold cluster formation, more than ¾ of the subjects erroneously predicted the outcome. One likely 
explanation was that the subjects impose “intention” to the behavior of individual entities of the emergent 
mold when no intention was involved in the emergence of the clusters. 
Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu, & La Vancher (1994) have reported multiple mental models used by 8th 
grade learners in reasoning about the human circulatory system. The system functions via two distinct 
loops, with one loop facilitating the circulation of blood to the body, while the other facilitates movement of 
blood between the heart and the lungs, the site at which blood gets oxygenated. The authors uncovered a 
variety of mental models including:  1) no loop (blood which is pumped throughout the body by the heart 
does not return to the heart); 2) ebb & flow (same blood vessels allow movement of blood between the 
heart and the body); 3) single loop (hierarchically, the first model that distinguished a need for 





the lungs where blood gets oxygenated); and 4) finally the accurate and complete model of a  double 
loop, described earlier. Not only do these models highlight the mental models of different models within 
causal systems, they also confirm previous findings that people can entertain multiple mental models of 
the same phenomenon (Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994). 
Expertise and Complex System Mental Models 
When examining complex systems such as the human respiratory system or an aquarium, 
experts and novices differ in their attention to the structural and functional components of complex 
systems (Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004; Hmelo-Silver, Marathe, & Liu, 2007).  When learning about an 
aquarium, 7th grade students and pre-service teachers (novices) identified the same number of structural 
components as did experts such as biology professors and aquarium hobbyists. The novice and expert 
learners, however, differed significantly in their understanding of function of the structural components, 
and the behaviors by which they achieved the functions. The mental models of novice learners comprised 
mainly of structural components (i.e. “component is …”) with little emphasis on behavior and function of 
the components. The experts’ mental models contained significantly more behavioral and functional idea 
units (i.e. “component does …; component serves as …; component does function x by doing behavior 
y.”, etc.) than the mental models of novices. Interestingly, conceptual differences in the nature of 
functional and behavioral idea units have been identified as a function of the experts’ domain knowledge. 
When asked about the human respiratory system, the physicians’ utterances covered abstract concepts 
and principles governing the global mechanics of gas flow as a function of gradient and pressure. In 
contrast, the functional and behavioral ideas volunteered by the respiratory therapists revolved mainly 
around practical comparisons between healthy and diseased states and how individual components’ 
function and behavior resulted in the respiratory system’s overall function in each state. As such, the 
physicians’ mental models were fluid models that allowed room for the system’s internal regulation to stay 
adaptive to the changes in the external environment (Jacobson, 2001). In other words, the physicians’ 
reasoning presented opportunities for simulating the function of the respiratory system from examining 
the causal relationships between its components than the practical reasoning used by the respiratory 
therapists (deKleer & Brown, 1982). Subjects’ prior knowledge (training in medicine) and meaning making 





the systems to be learned. Similar emphasis on structure at the expense of function and behavior was 
reported earlier in the document (Chi, Hutchinson, & Robin, 1989; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). 
Facilitating Mental Models though Instruction 
 
Kaplan and Black (2003) provided 7th graders with cues in the task of examining the causal effect 
of five factors contributing to flood levels (water pollution, water temperature, soil depth, soil type, and 
elevation). The subjects could explore the causal relations by reviewing records of previous floods. Cues 
were designed to discourage misconceptions and facilitate imagistic models through analogical reasoning 
(i.e. likening water pollution solubility to sugar or salt solubility in water), and comparative statements (i.e. 
sand has bigger grains than clay, or water can move easier through soil than through rock). Providing 
mechanistic cues increased the complexity of mental models (as defined by a combination of the number 
of components, causal relations, and interactions between components in each instance volunteered by 
subjects) in a statistically significant way. Participants who received mechanistic cues also made more 
controlled comparisons between potential causal factors, reported higher level of mental animation in 
reasoning about causal factors, and constructed more accurate models of flood than their non-cued 
counterparts. Kaplan and Black attributed the subjects’ improvement in refined inquiry and mental model 
complexity to the effect of mechanistic cues on lowering the burden of working memory as well as refined 
hypothesis generation. Interestingly, they reported no significant difference between the number of 
erroneous predictions made by the cued v. non-cued subjects.  
Direct manipulation animation (DMA), previously discussed in this document allowed the young 
learners to explore functional relationships between variables that underlie the principle of energy 
conservation (Chan & Black, 2006). The learners were able to change one of the roller coaster system 
variables using the screen slider and see how the change in that variable changed the overall roller 
coaster function. As a result, though beyond the immediate purpose for DMA development, the DMA as 
an instructional medium appears to have provided opportunities for the novice leaners to qualitatively 
simulate the various physical systems they studied (e.g. roller coaster) to learn about the underlying 
abstract physical phenomenon (conservation of energy). 
Explicit attempts to promote self-explanation have been shown to facilitate development of mental 





instructed to use self-explanation after reading about the human circulatory system showed a greater gain 
in content knowledge when compared to control subjects. Interestingly, when prompted to self-explain, 
the subjects generated different amounts of explanation. The high explainers were able to answer more 
complex questions about the function of different circulatory structures. Moreover, all high explainers 
were able to arrive at the accurate mental model of the human circulatory system (two loops), while 75% 
of low explainers and control subjects’ (not prompted to self-explain) mental models remained inaccurate 
and often incomplete. Though the differential amounts of self-explanation have been reported, the 
mechanisms underlying self-explanations and the ways self-explanation might uncover and address or 
perpetuate misconception are yet to be studied.  
Instruction that makes function more salient improves construction of mental models about 
complex systems (Liu & Hmelo-Silver, 2009; Youm, 2010).  In teaching pre-service teachers about the 
human respiratory system, Liu and Hmelo-Silver used two different sets of hypermedia comprised of 
different organization of information.  One method started the presentation with a slide on the overall 
system function (F-Hypermedia), while the other used a more traditional approach of starting with 
introducing structures before addressing their function (S-Hypermedia). For example the F-media began 
by a introducing the overall function of the human respiratory system to facilitate gas exchange, while the 
S-hypermedia began a discussion of the respiratory system by introducing lungs, bronchi, trachea, etc.    
The overall assessment of F-Hypermedia subjects’ mental models revealed a stronger focus on system 
behavior and function than structure. All subjects started with the least sophisticated mental models of 
respiratory system (people breathe to maintain the health of their lungs). The F-Hypermedia subjects 
appeared to achieve more sophisticated mental models progressively (from egocentric, to lung-centric, to 
systems-based models) when compared to the S-Hypermedia subjects.  
Youm (2010) randomly assigned subjects to functional, causal, and control groups and provided 
the treatment groups with pre-training to aid them in explicitly identifying causal or functional relationships 
when reading about description of complex systems.  Similar to de Kleer and Brown’s envisioning theory 
(1982), Youm’s functional relationships were operationalized as an extension of casual relationships- a 
simulation or “running” of the causal mental model. Causal relationships were defined as interactions 





factors, uniquely caused the ensuing variable. Functional relationships were defined as interactions that 
captured the nature of change between two variables. As such, functional relationships focused on 
dynamic explanation of ways by which change in one components of the system would result in a change 
in another location/ time. Before teaching her subjects about the space elevator or the greenhouse effect, 
Youm provided them with basic definitions and examples of causal and functional relationships. The 
subjects who were in the functional training group received instructional material in which functional 
relationships were made salient. Similarly, subjects in the causal group received casually salient 
instructional material. Generally, participants who had received pre-training on functional relationships 
used more reasoning strategies than their causal and control group counterparts. In fact, control group 
subjects’ verbal protocols revealed that without pre-training and explicit instruction to use either causal or 
functional reasoning to learn about systems, learners focused on learning from definitions and main ideas 
(superficial) rather than exploring relationships within systems. Moreover, learners who received 
functional relationship training acknowledge the difficulty of strategy use in simulating the system about 
which they learned. As such, Youm confirmed her hypothesis that making functional relationships salient 
in instruction would results in a strategy shift in novice learners, ultimately yielding more complete and 
functional mental models.  
Summary of Key Concepts 
Together, the studies reviewed above indicate:  
1. People construct mental models from simple sentences about general or specific situations. From 
the nature and frequency of errors made in verification of statements about temporal and spatial 
relations we know that people make mental models of time and space and they develop them by 
integrating information into singular, simple, linear, and perspective-independent models.   
 
2. People have naive theories and preconceptions about natural phenomena, which are rooted in 
their perceptual experiences with the physical world. These will in turn make people more 
vulnerable to developing misconceptions when learning about novel physical systems, especially 





emergent processes additionally contributes to the development of misconceptions that can be 
too robust to remedy with traditional instructional approaches.  
 
3. People use analogies and depictive models to reason about information to solve problems about 
physical systems in novel domains and situations. After some experience with the novel material 
(approximately three attempts), they seem to infer mental rules to increase the efficiency of 
problem solving. People move between rules and depictions and or different analogies of the 
same concepts to reason about the behaviors of physical systems.  
 
4. Multiple lines of evidence indicate that mental models of novice thinkers involve more structural 
elements than functional ones and as a result are inadequate and at times incomplete.  
 
5. Our current understanding of the Two-Stage Theory of mental model construction and the 
sequence of events involved in the process of envisioning suggests that mental models are 
constructed in a step-wise fashion. People start by encoding individual components, develop 
causal models, integrate individual component and causal models, and finally simulate the 
behavior of a system by running the integrated models in their minds to reason about the 
systems’ overall function. When learning about causality, people focus on the function of 
individual components (and possibly the ones of preceding components) and later integrate these 
individual component models to form a holistic model of the system. The facility and quality with 
which this integration occurs will determine the quality and accuracy of people’s overall mental 
models of causal systems.  
 
6. People construct mental models more effectively from both text and diagrams than either text or 
diagram alone.  To optimize mental model development during instruction and learning, the 
learners’ needs must inform the format of the presentation material. Relying solely on auditory 
and visual processing (text and diagrams) may limit the learner’s ability to conceptualize dynamic 
relationships that include rate (change of a variable over unit time) or functional relationships (the 





In such instances, including haptic stimuli and direct manipulation animation that enhance the 
effect of perception on developing mental models may result in more effective mental models and 
conceptual learning. 
 
7. Making functional and causal relationships salient to learners early on in instruction goes far to 
shift the learners’ attention from form to function. Training learners on what constitutes causal and 
functional relationship and modifying the organization of instructional material to highlight 
functional relationships result in development of more effective mental models.  
 
8. System complexity can result in development of misconceptions in both causal and emergent 
systems. Emergent systems in which levels of organization and collective behavior of individual 
components are less defined than causal systems present an especial challenge to mental model 
development.   
 
The next chapter discusses some of the gaps in our current understanding of causal complex systems 
and introduces the experiments and framework reviewed in the rest of the document that were designed 






CHAPTER 3: PRELIMINARY STUDIES 
Rationale 
The complex systems included in the previous chapter had two major factors in common: 1) the 
subjects would have ‘real life’ prior experience with all systems described; and 2) though complex, the 
systems did not capture the breadth of complexity resulting from functional coupling and interconnections 
routinely encountered in biological settings. The complex biological systems that have been used to 
inform our understanding of complexity (aquarium, respiratory and cardiovascular systems) are by 
definition, closed systems in which various components that form iterative functional loops to maintain a 
set state (homeostasis) through repetitive actions. For example, once the blood has circulated throughout 
the body, it always returns to the heart through the systemic loop, and once the blood fills the heart, it 
always leaves towards the various body regions to provide nourishment and oxygen (and the cycle 
repeats). Linear complex causal adaptive systems that interact with their environments to produce ‘end’ 
products have not yet been studied.   As such, the current gap in our understanding requires investigation 
of following concepts: 1) complex systems that form and evolve in environments which people cannot 
perceive based on everyday life experience; and 2) complex systems in which the causal and functional 
relationships between the different structures in the system are strictly linear (i.e. factories that produce 
products rather than loops than maintain the environment).  
Ideal examples of such systems are found in the highly complex, linear and causal biological 
systems by which DNA replicates itself (to conserve the genetic message across generations of cells) and 
transcribes and translates its message to proteins to provide life instructions for each and every event 
that takes place in living organisms. The number of structures and causal relationships between them are 
likely to overwhelm most learners’ working memory (intrinsic cognitive load) like no other system 
previously studied. The transcription/translation systems are in fact two individually complex linear 
systems that are coupled functionally (the product of the transcription system (messenger RNA) is used 
as the signal for the formation of the translation system, which will eventually produce the proteins). In 
other words, the second system does not assemble until the product of the first system appears in the 
environment to signal a need for assembly of the second system structures.  Furthermore, each system 





microscopic environment of the cell, which most people cannot interact with or readily imagine. As such, 
the preliminary studies included investigations of two distinct forms of causal complex system: a single 
causal complex system (CCS) by which one DNA parent molecule would be replicated to produce two 
new copies of the DNA molecule; and functionally coupled causal complex systems (FC-CCS) by which 
the DNA’s instructions for life are carried out through production of proteins.  
Research Question 
1. What are the characteristics of mental models of causal complex systems (CCS)? 
2. What are the characteristics of mental models of functionally coupled causal complex systems 
(FC-CCS)? 
Hypotheses 
1. Novice mental models of CCS (DNA replication) would include more structural elements than 
behavioral and functional elements.  
2. Novice mental models of FC-CCS (RNA transcription+ protein synthesis) would include more 
structural elements than behavioral and functional elements.  
3. Increase in complexity (increase in the number of structures and causal relationships between 
them) would adversely affect people’s mental models of the complex systems. As such, subjects’ 
mental models of FC-CCS (with a roughly twofold increase in number of structures) would contain 
a significantly smaller percentage of structural, functional, and behavioral elements than their 
mental models of the CCS.  
Method 
Setting 
All sessions were conducted with individual subjects in study rooms (free of distraction) at 
Gottesman Libraries, Teachers College, Columbia University.  
Participants 
Twenty subjects (3 male and 17 female) who had completed at least 2 semesters of college-level 
biology for life science majors participated in the study. The subjects included students from the City 
University of New York (CUNY) campuses at City College, Medgar Evers College, Brooklyn College as 






The sessions lasted roughly 60 minutes and were divided into the specific parts shown in Table 1 below: 
 Table 1: Overview of the Preliminary Study Session 
Part Task Duration 
(minutes)  
1 Overview of the study/ Consent process 15 
 
2 Review of the DNA molecule’s various components  15 
 
3 Mental Models of the DNA replication system (CCS) 15 
 
4 Mental Models of the RNA transcription and protein translation systems (FC-CCS) 15 
 
 
The subjects did not receive any monetary compensation for participation. To reward 
participation, I (given my prior teaching experience in college-level biology courses) reviewed the content 
discussed in the study with individual subjects, corrected misconceptions, and suggested strategies for 
the optimal organization of the material.  The subjects were provided with an 8.5*11 blank sheet of paper 
to draw diagrams and were asked to label all structures and associated actions for the DNA molecule as 
wells as the CCS and FC-CCS for which DNA served as the starting material. Subsequently, the subjects 
were asked to articulate the processes by which the CCS and FC-CCS accomplished their purposes 
(formation of 2 DNA molecules, and proteins respectively). The subjects’ descriptions of the processes 
were audio recorded and transcribed for further analysis.   
Study Design 
All subjects were asked the same questions about the CCS as well as the FC-CCS. As such, a 
within-subject design was used to study the differences between structural, behavioral, and functional 
components of mental models of different causal complex systems.   
Coding Schemes 
The Structure, Behavior and Function (SBF) coding scheme was used to score the drawings and 
transcripts (Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004). According to this coding system, elements of the systems 
constitute the structures (S), which carry out particular functions within systems (F). The various states 
each component can assume to perform its function defines its behavior (B). The microscopic systems 
studied in this document are different from systems studied in previous investigations in two distinct ways: 





behaviors) are complex biochemical processes, often still under examination by the scientific community 
(and not known or yet available to novice students of biology.) ; and 2) the causal nature of the system by 
definition requires that the systems’ overall functions result in final products. As such, the local actions of 
individual structures matter only when the whole chain of causality is carried out to result in the formation 
of the final product. To account for these differences, I treated each element of the system as a structure 
and their corresponding functions as their behaviors. The biochemical underpinnings of these functions 
(their behaviors by SBF definition) were excluded from scoring and coding as they clearly exceeded the 
scope of the study. Creation of ultimate products for the systems was scored as the overall system’s 
function (F). Specific rubrics used to evaluate the subjects’ mental models are provided for each system 
later in the document. 
DNA as A Complex Structure 
The DNA molecule is amongst the most complex structures encountered in science education. 
The structural complexity of the DNA molecule was not addressed in this study. Still, the subjects began 
the session by volunteering their knowledge of the DNA structure, as the specific components within the 
molecule give DNA the functional flexibility to serve as the starting point for the two causal complex 
systems mentioned throughout this document.  To remind the subjects of the structural affordances of the 
DNA molecule, the subjects were asked to draw and label different parts of the DNA molecule (Gibson, 
1979). The drawings were not included in the analyses of structural and functional knowledge of the 
systems reported in the sections below.  
Mental Models of a Causal Complex System (CCS) 
The DNA replication machinery was selected as the CCS. The subjects were asked the following: 
1) What is the purpose of DNA replication? 
2) a) Please draw and label all structures involved in the replication of the DNA molecule. b) What 
does each structure do to replicate the DNA? 
3) How is DNA replicated?  
The first question was designed to elicit the subjects’ understanding of the overall function of the CCS 
(function score). A dichotomous scale was used to score the answers. If the subjects answered that the 





exact language they used to answer the question), they received 1 point. If they did not answer, or 
answered incorrectly, they received zero points. 
The second question was designed to elicit the subjects’ knowledge of individual structures involved 
in the system (structure score) and their associated actions (behavior score).  To ensure the subjects 
were afforded an additional opportunity to recall all they knew about the system (given the large amount 
of information to be recalled), question 3 asked them to recap the process by which the system would 
develop the final product after they had volunteered their understanding of specific structures and 
behaviors in question 2. One point was given to any mention of structures or their corresponding actions 
(either graphically or verbally in response to either question 2 or 3) listed in Table 2 below. For example, 
subjects were given two points (one for structure and one for behavior) for mentioning either the biological 
name of a structure (i.e. the ligase enzyme) and its associated action (connecting the smaller DNA 
fragments to form a strand) or referring to it without mentioning its biological name specifically (i.e., “there 
is this enzyme, I don’t remember its name, but it comes in and joins all the small fragments and makes 
the whole strand.) Incorrect answers or no answers received zero points (no penalty). The exact 
biochemical process by which the ligase enzyme joined the individual fragments of newly produced DNA 


















Table 2: SBF scoring for Causal Complex System (DNA Replication) 
Structure Score  
(1 point per mention of any 
of the structure below) 
 
Behavior Score(s) Function Score 
 








1 point: system 
functions (overall) to 
produce 2 DNA 
















0 point: incorrect 










Total Function score: 1 
RNA primase 
 
1 point: makes RNA primer. 
RNA primer 
 
1 point: starts the duplicate strand. 
Helicase enzyme 1 point: separates the DNA strands by breaking 
the chemical bonds between them. 
 
Single stranded binding  
Proteins 
 
1 point: attaches to single strands of DNA to 
prevent rejoining of the strands. 
Replication fork 
 
No functional points given 
Topoisomerase 
 
1 point: cuts the DNA strand to prevent 






1 point: A binds T via 2 hydrogen bonds. 




1 point: is copied in fragments.  
Leading strand 
 
1 point: is copied continuously. 
DNA polymerase III 1 point: grows the new strands by adding 
nucleotides at the end of growing strands 
through complementary base pairing. 
 
DNA ligase 1 point: connects DNA fragments to form a whole 
new strand. 
 
RNA H enzyme 1 point: cuts out RNA primer pieces from the new 
strands. 
 
DNA Polymerase II 1 point: replaces the RNA primer pieces with 
DNA pieces. 
 
Total structure score: 14 Total behavior score: 14 
 
 
Mental Models of Functionally Coupled Causal Complex Systems 
 As the final part of the study, the subjects were asked the following: 
4) What is the purpose of RNA transcription and protein translation? 
5) a) Please draw and label all structures involved in the transcription of RNA and production of 





6) How is protein made from DNA?  
As previously stated, 1 point was given to any mention of structures or their corresponding actions listed 
in Table 3 below in either drawings and or utterances provided in response to either question 5 or 6.  
  Table 3: SBF scoring for Functionally Coupled Casual Complex Systems (Transcription +Translation) 
Structure Score  
(1 point per mention of any 
of the structure below) 
 
Behavior Score(s) Function Score 
DNA double helix 
 




1 point: Transcription 
machinery functions to 
produce a message 
from the DNA that can 
be delivered to the 
cytoplasm to be 











1 point: Translation 
machinery functions to 
make proteins from the 
message produced by 













0 point: incorrect 





Transcription factors 1 point: together with RNA polymerase form 
initiation complex/ regulate the transcription 
process. 
 
RNA polymerase 1 point: uses complementary base pairing to 
grow the RNA chain. 
 
Promoter 1 point: signals (by binding to the RNA 
polymerase) the specific gene to be transcribed. 
 
Nucleotides 1 point: A binds U. 
1 point: C binds G. 
 
hnRNA 1 point: initial transcript to be spliced further. 
 
Intron 1 point: gets spliced. 
 
Exon 1 point: gets retained. Forms messenger RNA. 
 
3’ polyA tail 1 point: gets added to the transcript to protect it 
from early degradation. 
 
5’ Guanine cap 1 point: gets added to the transcript to protect it 
from early degradation. 
 
Cytoplasm No functional points given. A compartment within 
the cell. 
 
Nucleus No functional points given. A compartment within 
the cell. 
 
Messenger RNA 1 point: delivers DNA message to the cytoplasm 
(final transcript). 
 
Ribosome 1 point: site of protein production. Reads over 




1 point: initiates the translation of the message 
into proteins. 
 







































Total function score: 2 
Transfer RNA 1 point: carries amino acids to the 
ribosome/mRNA complex. 
 
Codon 1 point: three letter code that codes for specific 
amino acids. 
Anticodon 1 point: complementary to the codon on tRNA, it 
helps match the right amino acid to the codon. 
 
A site  1 point: tRNA loaded with amino acid enters 
here. Codon/anticodon match is regulated. 
 
P site 1 point: peptide bond between two amino acids 
forms here. 
 
E site 1 point: where empty tRNAs go to leave for 
cytoplasm.  
 
Starter Amino acid 
(methionine) 
1 point: serves as starting building block for the 
nascent protein chain. 
 
Start codon (AUG) 1 point: the codon for the starter amino acid. 
 
Amino acids 1 point: building blocks for the nascent protein. 
 
Stop codon 1 point: signals the end of translation. 
 
Peptide bond 1 point: joins two amino acids together to form 
the nascent protein. 
 
Total structure score: 28 
 




The data from three participants was excluded from the final analyses as they experienced 
impasses too early in the session to continue with a meaningful investigation of their mental models.  
Data from 17 participants were used in the analyses reported in the sections below. 
SBF Knowledge of Different Types of Casual Complex Systems 
Table 4 shows the breakdown of structure, behavior and function scores for the CCS and FC-CCS. 
 
Table 4: SBF Analysis of Two Different Causal Complex Systems’ Mental Models 
System 
Type 
Structure Score % (SD) 
Range: Min-Max 
 
Behavior Score % (SD) 
Range: Min-Max 
Function Score % 
Range: Min-Max 
CCS 53.8 (15.2) 
Range: 21.4-78.6 
53.4 (14.8) 















The subjects demonstrated considerable difficulty when recalling the individual structures and 
their corresponding actions for both types of causal complex systems. Despite having discussed the 
content in at least two undergraduate biology courses, the subjects’ structural or behavioral knowledge of 
the systems remained below 70%. Still, 100% of the participants successfully articulated the products of 
both causal chains (systems’ functions). Moreover, there was great variability in both structural and 
behavioral knowledge as indicated by the range of both score sets (Table 4).  These findings provide 
evidence for the complexity the students and teachers experience when learning and teaching about such 
systems in science courses. It is important to note that an additional layer of complexity, the order in 
which each structure performs its specific task in the causal chain was excluded from the SBF scoring 
reported in the preliminary studies. A more detailed discussion of the order of appearance of structures 
and local actions in the overall causal chains of actions seen in causal complex systems is provided in the 
next chapter.   
Unlike findings from previous studies, the novice subjects recalled roughly the same percentage 
of structural elements as behavioral elements for CCS, the less complex of the two systems (Hmelo-silver 
&Pfeffer, 2004). As the system got more complex (two fold increase in the number of structures and 
relationships in FC-CCS), the subjects had a significantly better understanding of the structures than 
behaviors for FC-CCS (Table 4).  General Linear Model (GLM) analysis showed the differences between 
the structural and functional scores to be statistically significant (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.056, F=54.34, 
p<0.001). Despite these differences, all subjects demonstrated a correct understanding of the systems’ 
overall functions. These findings supported hypothesis 3 as increasing complexity significantly reduced 
the percent correct structural and behavioral elements the subjects recalled about FC-CCC (Table 4). The 
results also supported hypothesis 2 as the mental models of FC-CCC contained roughly three times more 
structural elements (67.9%) than behavioral elements (24.7%).  In the case of CCS (the less complex of 
the two systems), however, subjects recalled an equivalent amount of structural (53.8%) and behavioral 
(53.4%) elements.  
Despite differences in mental model compositions of the two system types, all subjects correctly 
recalled the overall functions of the two systems. This implied the possibility that when faced with such 





and selectively attended to those structures and behaviors they perceived of having a more direct 
connection to formation of the end product. To test this hypothesis, the frequencies with which subjects 
identified individual structures and behaviors were calculated (Tables 5 and 6 below). 
Table 5. Knowledge of individual structures and behaviors within CCS 
Structure % who identified structure and its 
corresponding behavior correctly 
 
The structures’ involvement in producing 
the CCS product 
Primer 58.5 Starts the process. 
 
Helicase 82.4 Starts the process. 
 
RNA Primase 17.6 Facilitates the process. 
 
SSB proteins 41.2 Facilitates the process. 
 
Nucleotides 100 Is critical to product formation. 
 
Topoisomerase* S:23.15     B: 17.6 Facilitates the process. 
 
Leading Strand 94.1 Is critical to product formation. 
 
Lagging strand 77.3 Is critical to product formation. 
 
DNA Polymerase III 76.5 Is critical to product formation. 
 
RNAH 0 Facilitates the process. 
 
DNA Polymerase II 5.9 Facilitates the process. 
 
Ligase 52.9 Ends the process. 
 
* The percent subjects correctly identifying the structure (S) was different than the percent subjects 
correctly identifying the structure’s behavior (B). 
 
Table 6. Knowledge of individual structures and behaviors within the functionally coupled causal complex 
systems 
 
Structure % who identified structure 
and its corresponding 
behavior correctly 
 
The structures’ involvement in producing 
the FC-CCS product 
RNA Polymerase 41.2 Starts the process. 
 
Promoter 23.5 Starts the process. 
 
Transcription Factors 0 Facilitates the process for system 1. 
 
hnRNA 11.8 Facilitates the process for system 1. 
 
Intron 70.6 Is critical to system 1 product formation. 
 






Guanine Cap 47.1 Facilitates the process for system 1. 
 
PolyA tail 58.8 Facilitates the process for system 1. 
 
mRNA 100 Product of system 1. The functional 
bridge between the two systems.  
 
Codon 88.2 Is critical to end product formation. 
 
Anticodon 70.6 Is critical to end product formation. 
 
tRNA 82.4 Is critical to end product formation. 
 
Starter amino acid 11.8 Facilitates the process for system 2. 
 
Amino acids 64.7 Is critical to end product formation. 
 
A site S: 41.2     B: 29.4 Facilitates the process for system 2. 
 
P site S: 41.2     B: 23.5 Facilitates the process for system 2. 
 
E site S: 41.2     B: 11.8 Facilitates the process for system 2. 
 
Stop Codon 29.4 Ends the process. 
 
* The percent subjects correctly identifying the structure (S) was different than the percent subjects 
correctly identifying the structure’s behavior (B). 
 
The patterns observed in reviewing the breakdown of the structural and behavioral knowledge of 
both forms of causal complex systems (Tables 5 and 6) provided support for the possibility that the 
subjects might have paid selective attention to those structures and behaviors they perceived to be of 
critical importance to the formation of product within each system.  In the case of CCS (Table 5) the 
structures that started and ended the process also received attention by most of the subjects. In the case 
of FC-CCS (Table 6), the starting structures for each system were recalled by many subjects (41.2% and 
100% recall), but the structures that would facilitate the end of the actions performed in system 2 was 
recalled by only 29.4% of the subjects. I theorized that the large number of structures and corresponding 
behaviors as well as the complexity of the relationships between them put a considerable load on the 
subjects, preventing them from effectively remembering the end of the causal chain. The point of 
connectedness (formation of the product from the first system that would serve as the starting material for 
the second one) was recalled by 100% of the subjects. Interestingly, while most regulatory structures and 
processes received little attention, the two regulatory structures (Guanine cap and polyA tail) that facilitate 





This could serve as additional evidence for the subjects’ understanding of the bridge (mRNA) between 
the two systems and the need to protect it from biochemical compromise to facilitate the action of the 
second system.  
 
Sample Utterances about the Mental Models of the Causal Complex System  
Examination of utterances by which the subjects provided an overview of the processes in each 
system offered additional support to the aforementioned observations. Examples have been provided 
below to demonstrate how subjects appeared to reduce the large number of structures and their 
corresponding behaviors to smaller lists of structures necessary to make sense of a process by which the 
system(s) would form the final products.   Each subject recalled a fraction of the structures involved in the 
process. The total number of structures involved in DNA replication was 14 (Tables 2). The texts below 
are unedited transcripts of utterances (and as such include scientific and grammatical errors). 
 
Subject 014 on CCS: First, you have helicase, it opens it up and then you have two 
strands, the lagging and the leading.  The one which is going to proceed from 5’ to 3’ is 
the leading; the other also proceeds from 5’ to 3’ but using the fragments. Leading strand 
is one whole strand, lagging is many fragments.  RNA primer helps recognize where to 
start by binding to the DNA. And then DNA polymerase will just add to the strand 
(structures identified: 5).  
 
Subject 018 on DNA Replication: I remember that DNA helicase unwinds the DNA.  
DNA gyrase helps put the torsional strain, then single strand binding proteins prevent the 
strand from winding again and then the RNA primase creates RNA primer, and the DNA 
polymerase starts putting nucleotides after RNA primer and then there is leading strand 
and the lagging strand, and the leading strand is being continuously translated, while the 
lagging strand is not being translated. I always get confused. The leading strand is being 
continuously replicated while the lagging strand is being replicated in portions. What 
else? What else? That is all that I remember. Oh, well, there is also the origin of 
replication, the lagging strand is being replicated towards the origin of replication and the 
leading strand is being replicated away from the origin of replication.  It depends, 
[marking 5 and 3 primes] on who gets replicated first, whichever is replicated first is the 
leading strand (structures identified: 10). 
 
Sample Utterances about the Mental Models of the Functionally Coupled Causal Complex System  
  Similar to the findings from the single casual complex system above, the subjects appeared to 
distill the large number of structures and their corresponding behaviors to a smaller list of structures to 
possibly cope with the complexity of the processes by which the systems would work together to form the 
final product (protein).   Each subject recalled a fraction of the structures involved in the process. The 






Subject 02 on the functionally coupled systems: DNA transcription is when you go 
from DNA to RNA. Several steps have to be taken.  You have three basic steps. You 
have the initiation, where u have the primer stuff. You have the elongation, where you 
add to the chain, and the termination where you stop it.  You start with one of the strands, 
the 3’ to 5’. So when you make your RNA, it goes from 5’ to 3’ end. That is the direction 
of your synthesis. You take the template strand, you look for complementary base pairs, 
A instead of now being paired with T is paired with U.  RNA polymerase II I think? It goes 
along the template strand, transcribes the mRNA.  The mature [RNA] takes several 
processes. Like the splicing when you cut off the intron.  Now I think I remember what 
you are asking. Several portions of DNA that code for genes, the exons, and in between 
you have exons, which you join together, to make mRNA, then you have capping and 
addition of poly A tails to protect the mRNA for it to be able to go to the cytosol from 
nucleus to protect it from degradation by DNase.  You have a promoter.  It is a regulatory 
that has the TATA box, where the transcription will start from. It is that promoter region, in 
front of the gene. Before, at the 5’ before the sequence starts. If the promoter region is 
not found, it won’t transcribe.  The tRNA is going to look for a codon that has 
complementary sequence and then makes the protein, like AUG I know apart from being 
the start codon, codes for methionine I think, so if you have that AUG in another 
sequence, the tRNA that carries that AUG, is going to bind to it and produce the 
methionine protein. rRNA has two subunits, you got three spaces there, exit, and amino 
acid side, E, P, A amino acid side, the next amino acid in the chain comes here, by the 
time it comes here, the protein side, it joins the protein, E for exit. After it finds the next 
amino acid, the tRNA exits. The mRNA comes in, and reading here on the other side of 
the subunits (across from tRNA) (structures identified: 19).  
 
Subject 05 on the functionally coupled systems: the mRNA is actually translated from 
3’ as it enters through the ribosome, do you want me to give you the A, E site?... you 
have the small and large subunit, the codon, the triplets is on the mRNA, and the 
anticodon will be on this, on the tRNA, the transfer RNA.  [tRNA] is the clover leaf 
[referring to the shape of the molecule], anti-codon is here. As mRNA passes through the 
ribosome, AUG is usually the starter code, but also codes for methionine. So the 
anticodon is complementary and then the amino acid that correlates with the triplet code 
will be produced (structures identified: 10). 
 
Cognitive Strategies 
        At the end of the session, each subject was asked to confirm whether they envisioned and 
simulated the actions of the system in their mind’s eyes in recalling structures and their 
corresponding behaviors (deKleer & Brown, 1982). They were specially asked to verify whether 
they visualized movement of any structures in the system. All (100%) subjects denied having 
simulated the action of either complex system in their mind’s eye (or ever before as they first 
learned about the material). All mentioned using a memory of static images and texts (or lists they 
had developed when they were taking notes of their own to study the material) to answer my 







This multipart study managed to address the original hypotheses and research questions. The 
findings reported in Table 4 supported two of the hypotheses partially and corroborated and previous 
findings that given high complexity, novice subjects retain more information about structural attributes of a 
complex system than behavioral ones (Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004). The finding that the subjects 
demonstrated a strong understanding of the systems’ overall functions (the final products of each system) 
independently of the extent of the gaps in their structural or behavioral knowledge was novel.  
The third hypothesis claimed that increase in structural and relational complexity would adversely 
affect the individual mental model subscores (structure, behavior, and functions subscores). The data in 
table 4 supports this hypothesis partially. The FC-CCS contained 28 structures, while the CCS included 
14 structures (FC-CCC roughly twice as complex as the CCS). The subjects’ structural scores for the FC-
CCS (67.9%)  was surprisingly higher than their structural scores of the CCS (53.8%), but the behavioral 
score, as expected was significantly lower for FC-CCS (24.7%) than CCS (53.4%) (Table 4). Despite the 
increase in complexity, the subjects were just as successful in identifying the (coupled) functions of the 
systems that made up the FC-CCS as they were in identifying the function of the less complex CCS and 
100% of the subjects correctly recalled the final products of both systems.  
Based on the quantitative and qualitative findings, I additionally theorized the following: 
1) When learning about causal complex systems, people learn about the overall purpose of the 
system (end product) at the macro level, while simultaneously attempting to learn about the 
structural and behavioral details that form the chain of causality at the micro level (Jacobson, 
2001).  
2) Despite the small sample size, the findings implied that envisioning or mental animation was not 
the default strategy novice learners used to form mental models of causal complex systems 
(deKleer & Brown, 1982; 1984).  
3) Despite not reporting any mental animation, the qualitative and quantitative data (Tables 4, 5, and 
sample utterances above) implied that novice learners paid selective attention to specific parts of 
the system (possibly as a function of their perceived importance in creating the final product of 





structure and causal relationships between them might be strategically reduced by novice 
learners by focusing on key structures and behaviors of highest functional relevance to the 
formation of end products (Sweller, 1994).  
The study had several limitations.  The small sample size for the preliminary studies made it 
impossible to gain a robust quantitative understanding of the variety of cognitive strategies subjects used 
to learn about such causal complex systems. Moreover, no content instruction or review material were 
provided to the subjects. I relied on the subjects’ undergraduate training from different undergraduate 
intuitions to inform the subjects’ mental models of two different kinds of causal complex systems. As such, 
the variations in the quality of instruction individual subjects had received in their undergraduate biology 
courses was not adequately investigated.  The data cannot be used to infer whether the findings could be 
solely attributed to the high complexity of the systems to be learned, quality of previous instructional 
design (and by extension, the subjects’ prior knowledge), or a combination of both factors.  Experiments 1 
and 2 described later in the document attempted to address these variables by providing a standard 
instruction of the material to subjects with little to no prior knowledge of the material.  
While I adjusted the SBF framework to more effectively reflect the characteristics of the complex 
molecular systems studied in this document, the orders in which structures appeared in the chain of 
causality to perform their respective functions in each system were largely ignored. The SBF framework 
commonly used to study mental models of causal complex systems appeared to be inadequate in 
comprehensively capturing all subcomponents of the subjects’ mental models of these complex systems. 
The next chapter provides an overview of an augmented and modified version of the SBF framework 






CHAPTER 4: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMPLEXITY 
Current Contexts for Complexity 
In general, complex systems in the current body of literature have been defined as systems with 
multiple layers of heterogeneous components that share causal relationships that may result in emergent 
or non-emergent behaviors (Chi, 2005; Hmelo-Silver & Azevedo, 2006; Jacobson, 2001). More 
specifically, the types of complex systems that have been studied to date include:  
o Complicated systems (Hmelo-Silver & Azevedo, 2006; Hegarty & Just, 1993; Hegarty, 1992): 
Systems comprised of multiple identical components which interact using cause and effect 
processes to perform specific functions. Multiple pulley systems are amongst the well-studied 
systems of this kind. 
o Complex non-adaptive emergent systems (Jacobson, 2001): Systems that are made of multiple 
components capable of self-organization, whose interactions result in emergent behavior (i.e. 
snow fall and snowflakes). The agents in these systems do not evolve behaviorally in response to 
the environmental cues.  
o Complex adaptive emergent systems (Goldstone & Sakamoto, 2003; Jacobson, 2001): Systems 
comprised of many agents which despite initial similarities can become specialized and self-
organize by the virtue of the interactions between different agents to result in emergent 
behaviors. Examples include growth of cities from household or growth of body systems from 
organs, tissues and cells. In contrast to non-adaptive complex systems, these systems adapt to 
the information received from the environment.  
o Complex adaptive direct closed systems comprised of causal relationships (Chi, 2005; Chi, 
Leeuw, & LaVancher, 1994; Hmelo-Silver, & Pfeffer, 2004): Various structures capable of 
assuming different states (local behaviors) interact to perform the systems’ global function. For 
example, a heart valve (structure) capable of closing and opening (its local function) works in 
concert with other structures of the human cardiovascular system to ensure unidirectional blood 
flow (local function) to ultimately provide all cells of the body with nutrients and oxygen (ultimate 





their environments. The Structure Function Behavior (SBF) framework has been used 
successfully to investigate these systems.  
The causal complex natural systems studied to date include the ecosystem of an aquarium, the 
human circulatory and respiratory systems as well as computer simulations that capture self-organizing, 
emergent phenomena (e.g. mold cluster formation).  These systems are complex indeed.  Still, the fixed 
behavioral states their structures can assume and fixed transition states that define the systems’ overall 
processes make the nature of their complexity more aligned with complicated physical systems than the 
highly complex systems encountered when reasoning about microscopic natural systems with which the 
reasoners have virtually no sensory experience. The difference in layers of complexity between the 
physical and natural systems studied to date and the novel molecular systems that inform the 
experiments in this document are detailed in the following sections. 
Potential for Underestimating System Complexity 
Previous applications of the System, Behavior, and Function (SBF) framework risk the potential 
for inconsistency in application and ultimately underestimating the complexity of the systems studied. For 
example, on distinguishing between the set of rules (behavioral v. functional elements) that define the 
behavior of an aquarium, Hmelo-Silver and Pfeffer (2004) have commented: 
… a mention of a fish hiding (“Fish come by and they hide in there between the little 
plants”) or bacterial processes (“Bacteria … changes the ammonia into nitrate and then 
nitrate into nitrate back into clean water”) was coded as behavioral concept. This was 
coded as a behavior because it refers to a mechanism for how the clearing of water (a 
function) was accomplished. An utterance that mentioned filter removing byproducts (“A 
filter filters out the organic waste”) or light as energy source for plants and algae (“Live 
plants, some other organisms need the light to help photosynthesis”) was coded as a 
functional concept.  
 
This suggests that bacteria, fish and the filter are treated as equivalent structures within the 
aquarium as the setting for a complex system. From this structural equivalence, however, one cannot 
infer a behavioral equivalence beween the metabolism of nitrogenous waste by the bacteria (biolgoical 
filters), the (physical) filter removing waste and the fish hiding in the plants. It is unclear how fish hiding 
contributes to the overall function of clearing the water.  Moreover, the application of SBF framework to 





bacteria and physical filtration by the actual filter) that contribute to the overall function without exploring 
causal relations between them.  
Similarly, on the study of the human respiratory system as the context for complexity, 
Hmelo-Silver, Marathe, & Liu (2007) comment: 
 
Behavior referes to mechanisms of how structures of a system achieve their 
outcome or function. Both the macroscopic and microscopic structures have certain 
behaviors associated with them. Behavior can also be nested (the behavior of an organ 
is, in part, the result of the various types of tissues it is composed of), or they can be 
interacting (the behaviors of different genes interact to give rise to overall, visible 
behavior of the organism). In the respiratory system, the behavior of the ribs, namely 
moving outward, results in an expansion of the volume of the chest, causing a decrease 
in pressure. Air flows into the lungs from the higher pressure in the ambient air to the 
lower pressure in the lungs. Here the movement of the ribs is the system behavior, and 
the underlying reason for this behavior (to allow inhalation) is the function. 
 Finally, functions refer to the role of an element in a system (e.g., the alveoli are 
where gas exchange occurs). Many different structures at various levels of organization 
can behave in an interacting manner to fulfill the function. For example, central to 
understanding respiratory sytem is knowing that a main function is to supply oxygen to 
provide engery and that the behaviors, such as cellular processes, enable that function. 
Its strucutres, such as the lungs, perform these behaivors. Indeed, different organisms 
have different structures that exhibit a variety of behaviors to fulfill identical functions.  
 
On the coding of behavior, the movement of ribs does indeed contribute to the expansion of the 
chest volume and facilitates inhalation through creation of negative pressure. Still, the assertion that the 
function of the ribs is to allow inhalation underestimates the causal complexity that underlies inhalation. 
The various physical rules governing gas behavior as a funciton of volume and pressure that facilitate 
inhalation are upheld by more than ribs in this situation. For example, a punctured lung in which the 
pressure in the pleural space has been compromised cannot effectively inhale even if the ribs are capable 
of functioning by moving outward. 
While the SBF framework is an effective tool to study complex physical systems, the distinction 
between behavioral and functional attributes in complex biologicall (molecular) systems required to use 
the framework can only be made artificially. Most biological complex systems either maintain set 
environments (feedback loops) or result in end products (pathways). As such, one solution to develop a 
more effective framework to study biological complexity might be to eliminate the concept of behavior, 
and instead return to the classic distinction between function and form (structure). Each system has a 
singluar overall function (Global Function), while each component within the system can be expceted to 





The process by which local functions facilitate the global function within each system can be 
conceptualized as the mechanism of the system’s actions (as it is commonly referred to in biological 
texts). These solutions are explored later in this chapter. 
 
Behavioral States and State Transitions 
 deKleer and Brown (1981) have proposed that overall behavior of physical systems (i.e. a buzzer) 
is the culmination of individual components’ local behaviors, which is in turn governed by a set of rules. 
The overall behavior of the buzzer can be defined using the combination of rules (causal relationships) 
below:  
The clapper switch of the buzzer closes, which causes the coil to conduct a current, 
thereby generating an electromagnetic field, which in turn pulls the clapper arm away 
from the switch contact, thereby opening the switch, which shuts off the magnetic field 
allowing the clapper arm to return to its closed position, which then starts the whole 
process over again. 
 
Each sentence in the statement above, by definition refers to the fixed behavioral states individual 
components can assume. For example, the clapper switch can close and open, and the magnetic field 
can be on or off. Similar rule sets can be developed for some of the biological systems, which are 
analogous to physical systems. For example, a partial schema of blood flow in the circulatory system 
studied by Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu, & La Vancher (1994) can be summarized using the following set of rules: 
The left atrium contracts, pushing the blood into the left ventricle by opening the bicuspid valve. The left 
ventricle contracts, and pushes the blood out by opening the aortic semilunar valve. The blood flows 
throughout the body, and returns to the relaxed right atrium, which then contracts to open the tricuspid 
valve and fill the right ventricle, which then contracts and opens the pulmonary semilunar valve, which 
facilitates flow of blood to the lungs, which return the blood to the relaxed left atrium, and the process 
starts all over again. As such, the local functions of individual components become evident (i.e. atria 
contract and relax while valves open and close). The product of this iteration is to maintain blood flow. 
What happens when the causal system’s overall goal is to form a product and having achieved that goal, 
it comes to a halt or ceases to exist (disintegrates until the next time the product is needed?) 
 The biochemical processes in living organisms provide ideal systems to study non-
iterative, causal complexity. For example, the set of rules that would describe the DNA replication 





helicase enzyme unwinds and opens the DNA strands by breaking the chemical bonds between 
the strands. This in turn, forms a replication fork and creates a supercoil upstream in the 
molecule, which is relieved by topoisomerase that makes small cuts in the DNA strand. As the 
single strand binding proteins bind single strands of DNA to prevent them from rejoining each 
other, the RNA primase generates a primer sequence, which serves as the starting material for 
the new DNA strands to be made. DNA polymerase grows one of the new strands continuously 
by adding nucleotides to the primer using the principle of complementary base pairing. As the 
parent single strands bond to the new copies, the single strand binding proteins fall off the parent 
strands. On the opposite lagging strand, the new strand forms in fragments as DNA polymerase 
adds a few nucleotides at a time to multiple RNA primers. The fragments are joined together by 
the ligase enzyme, after which RNAH removes the RNA primers, while another form of DNA 
polymerase replaces the primers with DNA. Each of the two newly copied strands wraps around a 
parent strand from which it was copied to form two double helices (Pray, 2008b). 
  A closer look and comparison between the rules that govern DNA replication and the 
aforementioned ones for the buzzer or the circulatory system reveal that behavior of the individual 
components within the replication system cannot be deciphered from the rule set for the whole 
system. The components of the buzzer or circulatory system have fixed (dichotomous) states, 
with each component capable of closing/opening or being on or off at any given time. The 
individual components in the DNA model, however, do not enjoy fixed states. Instead, they 
appear in the local environment to help create the molecular systems needed to perform specific 
functions at specific times and disappear after the need is met. In such a case, it might be more 
efficient to deemphasize the structure’s behavior and focus more on its local function.  
deKleer and Brown (1981) wanted to understand how the knowledge of individual components’ 
behaviors (aforementioned rules and states) results in the overall understanding of the system’s function 
(buzzing).  To that end, transition sates were defined to denote the temporal order of the system’s 
behavior starting at a particular time point (t0). Figure 1 below provides the transitions they proposed to 





Figure 1. The deKleer and Brown’s (1981) Buzzer Transition Table and Transition States  
 
 
The temporal order of biological systems that maintain set environments resemble the iterative 
transition states shown above (i.e. blood flow previously described). Casual complex systems that 
terminate in end products, however, represent a linear, non-iterating temporal order. As such, these 
systems do not have any transition states by which the different components’ specific states can be 
reported at any given time point. Instead, the combination of different components’ states causes the next 
combination of states to emerge. For example DNA replication can be summarized in the following 
temporal order: 
Figure 2: Temporal Order of a Linear Causal Complex Biological System (DNA Replication) 
Helicase unwinds double helix  helicase separates the DNA strands the SSB 
binds the individual strands to prevent them from rejoining each other.  
 
SSB holds open the single parent strands, while the RNA Primase forms Primer 
(simultaneous events) primer binds single strand  DNA polymerase adds 
nucleotides to one end of the primer to elongate the growing DNA copy  
SSB proteins come off the joined double (one new and one parent) strands of DNA. 
 
Leading strand is replicated by DNA polymerase continuously, while the lagging 
strand is formed in smaller fragments (simultaneous events)  Ligase joins the 
fragments  RNAH enzyme cuts the primers out of the small fragments A second 
DNA polymerase replaces the primer with DNA sequences. 
 
Each new strand wraps around its complementary parent strands and winds back up 






SBF does not include a term that adequately addresses the temporal order of events that 
comprise the overall behavior of causal complex biological systems such as the one described in Figure 
2. A potential solution, to augment the framework with a score for mechanism will be explored next.  
SBF Modified 
The SBF framework presented several limitations when applied to the linear causal complex biological 
systems used in the preliminary study: 
1) Linear complex systems work like microscopic factories that result in “end” products. Ultimate 
understanding of such complex systems must include an index for one’s understanding of the 
systems’ end products. The application of behavior and function terms have been limited to 
individual structures within a system and have not adequately accounted for the systems’ overall 
products. To remedy this, a sound framework to study linear complex biological systems must 
include an index that refers to the systems’ overall function (development of the end product). 
This is especially pertinent to functionally coupled systems (prevalent in living organisms) in 
which knowledge of individual structures and their corresponding behaviors is of little use if one 
ultimately cannot demonstrate understanding of how the functional bridge (product of the first 
system) serves as the template for the function of system 2 (final product of the coupled 
systems).  
2) The current applications of SBF framework do not address the concept of mechanism (the 
specific order in which actions and behaviors must be carried out to result in the formation of end 
products) in any complex biological system. For example, the atrium of the heart (structure) 
stores blood (function) and contracts (behavior) to facilitate blood flow to the ventricle (Chi, 
Leeuw, Chiu, LaVancher, 1994). In reality, normal atrial contraction should take place at an exact 
time in the cardiac cycle to be useful to the cardiovascular system (sequence). If the atrium 
contracts out of turn (despite the fact that contraction is its inherent behavior), cardiac pathology 
follows. The temporal order of events in the form of a “mechanism” index is missing from the 
current SBF framework. 
3) The arguably simplified distinctions between behavior and functions of structures downplay the 





many molecular and cellular events, we are able to conceptualize the function of an entity within 
the system (when its absence or dysfunction results in system malfunction), but are far from 
discovering the specific biochemical interactions that comprise the specific behavior by which the 
structure achieves its function. In the absence of such knowledge, insistence on distinguishing 
between function and behavior of structures presents an inauthentic challenge to studying 
complexity in linear biological systems.  
To address these challenges, I proposed a Structure (S), (local) function of each structure (f), 
Mechanism (M) (the step-by-step action sequence necessary for the system’s function), and the overall 
systems’ Function (F) (which captures the formation of end product). The SfMF framework was applied to 
investigate mental models of a single and two functionally connected causal complex biological systems 






CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENT 1 
THE EFFECTS OF ENVISIONING STRATEGY TRAINING AND TEXT ORGANIZATION ON MENTAL 
MODELS OF A NATURAL COMPLEX CAUSAL SYSTEM 
 
Research Question 
This study aimed to explore people’s mental models of causal complex systems (CCS) and determine 
how they differ from mental models of other complex systems studied to date. Specifically, the experiment 
was designed to answer the following research question: Does text organization and or teaching people 
the strategy to use envisioning (simulating the function of the system) affect people’s mental models of 
causal complex systems? 
 
Hypotheses 
Based on the literature and findings from the preliminary study, I operationalized mental model complexity 
as a combination of structural, functional, and mechanistic knowledge of CCS and hypothesized that: 
1) Training subjects to use the envisioning strategy while learning about the CCS to simulate the 
function of the system would improve the subjects’ CCS mental model complexity scores 
significantly. 
2) Using a function-salient text organization (v. structure salient text) would improve the subjects’ 
CCS mental model complexity scores significantly.  
3) Visuospatial abilities measured by shape memory and paper folding scores would significantly 
predict the CCS mental model complexity scores. The higher the visuospatial abilities, the higher 
the subjects’ CCS mental model complexity score.    
4) The interaction between text organization and envisioning strategy training would be significant. 
The subjects assigned to the function-salient text+ strategy training condition would have the 
highest CCS mental model complexity score, while the subjects assigned to the structure-salient 
text+ no strategy training would have the lowest CCS mental model complexity score. 
Study Design/Analysis 
A 2*2 factorial design was used to set up the study, in which each factor contained two levels. 





system (strategy training). The other half reviewed the same instructional material, but did not receive 
training or instruction to envision while learning (no strategy training). Similarly, half of the participants 
received a stimulus in which the text organization made the structures within the system salient, while the 
other half received a stimulus in which the function of various components was made salient using the 
reorganization of the sentences. As such, with the exception of sentence order, the information presented 
and sentences used in both versions of the text were identical.  
 





Structure-salient text (S) Function-salient text (F) 
Strategy training (Y) Received training to envision. 
Received a structure-salient 
stimulus. 
 
Received training to envision. 
Received a function-salient stimulus. 
No Strategy training (N) Did not receive training to 
envision. Received a structure-
salient stimulus.  
Did not receive training to envision. 




Eighty graduate students (Teachers College (TC), Columbia University) with no prior knowledge or some 
previous learning (high school-level) of the DNA replication system participated in the study (75% female, 
25% male). Participants were offered 10 $/ hour (20 $ total).  The recruitment announcement on TC portal 
made the requirement of low prior knowledge of the topic explicit. Moreover, the participants were 
provided with a pretest to determine any prior knowledge that could affect the study outcome. A random 
number generator (Graph Pad) was used to pre-assign the subjects to the aforementioned conditions 
randomly.  
Study Session Agenda 
I met with the subjects individually in the Teachers College Gottesman Library independent study 








Event Number of Minutes 
Pretest 5 
Consent process 10 
ETS shape memory test  10 
ETS paper folding test 10 
Pre-training (Review of DNA structure handout)  5 
Review of strategy training material 10 
Strategy training (varied by condition) 10 
Presentation of the stimulus (DNA replication handout)  30 
Posttest/ interview 30  
Total session time 120 minutes 
 
After a comprehensive consent process, all participants were presented with the pre-test, the 
1976 Educational Testing Services (ETS)’s Cognitive Factor Kit instruments for shape memory and paper 
folding tests, and the pre-training session to review the DNA structure before learning about how it could 
be replicated (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Derman, 1976). As such, the first forty minutes of all sessions 
were identical independently of the condition to which participants were randomly assigned.  
Materials and Procedures 
All subjects were presented with the Shape Memory (SM) and Paper Folding (PF) components of 
the ETS Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests to determine if individual differences in visuospatial 
ability would affect the subjects’ mental models of CCS (Mayer & Sims, 1994; Ekstrom, French, Harman, 
& Derman, 1976). For pre-training, all subjects were provided with a handout titled Structure of the DNA 
Molecule (Appendix A), which provided an overview of the two strands of DNA, as well as the four 
different types of nucleotides and the specific pairing possible between them (Pray, 2008a; Mayer & 
Moreno, 2003).  Having completed the DNA structure pre-training, the subjects were presented with two 
handouts sequentially, one with 8 frames depicting the inner workings of a bicycle pump (physical 
system) used in a previous study by Mayer and Sims (1994), and another with a diagram of an enzyme’s 
lock and key model of action (biological system).  
The two groups that received envisioning training received the following additional paragraph of 
text that described the process of envisioning as a strategy: 
Envisioning is a problem solving strategy by which you use your knowledge of the 
system’s structure and relationships between structures to simulate the function of the 
system in your mind. To use the envisioning strategy, you should first build a model of all 
structures within the system. Once you have an adequate understanding of the 
structures, you can examine the relationships between the structures. Questions you 
might ask yourself to help you build the structural and relational models are: 1) what does 
each structure do?;  2) what are the different states in which each structure can exist 





structures in the system? Please review these handouts and practice envisioning how a 
bicycle pump works to pump air into a tire and how enzymes facilitate chemical reactions. 
Your ultimate goal is to see movement of all parts of the system that can move in your 
mind’s eye (like an animated version or short movie of the processes).  
 
The subjects in the other two groups that did not receive envisioning training simply were asked 
to learn about the inner workings of a bicycle pump using the diagrams and the lock and key model of 
enzyme function from the handout (they were not provided the paragraph above). To confirm that the 
subjects provided with envisioning strategy were indeed able to envision the processes, I asked them to 
recite the inner working of the pump and enzyme to me from memory. I confirmed that all subjects’ 
envisioning included “movement” of the different components of systems before proceeding to the next 
step of the experiment. The subjects in the no strategy training group received additional minutes of 
review time with the pump and enzyme handouts to ensure all subjects experienced identical time laps 
between the presentation of the DNA pertaining handout and the instructional stimuli detailed below. 
Depending on their randomly assigned conditions, the subjects received either a structure-salient or a 
function-salient handout describing DNA replication (Appendices B& C). Based on the advantages 
reported for static media to animated presentations, I chose a static, pre-labeled diagram of the DNA 
replication process and text to introduce as the instructional material (Mayer, Hegarty, Mayer, & 
Campbell, 2005; Hegarty, Kriz, and Cate, 2003). Moreover, I “weeded” out all details that would compete 
with the content learning for the subjects’ attention. This included truncating the structures’ Latin names 
(e.g. Helicase enzyme was referred to as the H enzyme). Pre-training on the DNA structure, labeling and 
weeding out the details were expected to reduce cognitive load (Mayer & Moreno, 2003). Expert 
overviews were used as the standard for the amount of details (number of structures and steps in the 
process) the novice subjects could reasonably be expected to know (Pray, 2008a, b). 
The subjects were provided one 8.5x11 sheet of blank paper to use for optional note taking and 
were reminded of the post-test and the interview to follow the experimental period of learning about DNA 
replication. The subjects in the strategy training groups were asked to use the envisioning strategy about 
which they had just received training to learn about the DNA replication process. The subjects in the no 
strategy training groups were asked to use whatever strategies they normally used in learning science to 
learn about the DNA replication process from the handout. All subjects were provided with a post-test 





and their purpose (Chi, Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994). Following completion of the post-test, all 
subjects participated in a brief interview and were asked to: 1) tell me how DNA is replicated step-by-step 
(to augment the responses just in case they found the writing/ drawing task difficult); 2a) compare the 
experience of envisioning the pump, enzyme, and the DNA replication systems (limited to the envisioning 
training groups); and 2b) tell me about the strategies they used to learn about the system (limited to the 
no envisioning training group).  The experimental session, transcription of interviews, scoring of post-
tests, and data entry took approximately 3 hrs. per subject to complete.  
 
Scoring 
I used the Structure, function, Mechanism, and Function (SfMF) framework proposed in chapter 4 
to score the post-tests and interview transcripts. Mention of each correct structure, its corresponding 
function or the specific step in the mechanism received 1 point. For example, the written response “the H 
enzyme comes in and breaks apart the two DNA strands” received two points, one for identification of the 
H enzyme (structure) and the other for identifying its local function (f). The utterance “after the H enzyme 
opens it [the DNA] up, the SSB proteins would have to bind the strands to prevent them from going back 
and rejoining the other stand.” counted as two points for identification of the H enzyme and SSB proteins 
(structure), two points for identification of the H enzyme and the SSB proteins’ local functions, and two 
points for correctly identifying the mechanism (specific steps) in which the H enzyme and SSB proteins 
interact with the DNA parent molecule to facilitate the system’s function. A detailed scoring rubric is 
provided in Appendix E. No penalties were assigned to incorrect answers. 
Previous studies have typically used the utterances and or written responses to “interpret the 
quality” or “categorize” the different mental models demonstrated by subjects (Chi, Leeuw, Chiu, & 
LaVancher, 1994; Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004). The subjective natures of such interpretation or 
categorization efforts required establishing agreement between at least two raters. No such interpretation 
or categorization took place in this study. Instead, I scored the written responses and interview transcripts 
for the presence or absence of correct references to structures, functions, and mechanism steps to 
determine the completeness of mental models as well as its subcomponents. Though I allowed for 





answer was possible for each of the items mentioned in Appendix E. A Mental Model Complexity (MMC) 
Score was calculated by adding structural, functional, and mechanistic subscores as well as the subjects’ 
overall function scores (Black and Kaplan, 2003). As such, the MMC score would be represented in the 
SfMF framework using the following formula: MMC= S+f+M+F. 
Results 
Eighty subjects were randomly assigned to four different conditions using the GraphPad random 
number generator. The data from three subjects were immediately excluded from the analysis (one from 
each of the following conditions: FY, SY, and SN) as the post-test interview indicated that they had 
reached an impasse too early in the learning process to merit a meaningful investigation of their mental 
models. Data from 77 subjects were used for multivariate analysis of variance in which the type of text 
organization (structure v. function salience) and strategy training (presence v. absence) were used as 
predictors and the structure, function, and mechanism subscores served as the dependent variables. 
To account for the influences of individual differences in visuospatial abilities, the participants’ 
shape memory (SM) and paper folding (PF) scores (ETS 1976 Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests) 
were used as covariates (Mayer & Sims, 1994).  Surprisingly, initial analyses revealed that SM and PF 
worsened the overall model and did not serve as effective covariates (a summary of this analysis is 
provided in Appendix J). As such, they were excluded from further analyses reported in this document.  
In addition, exploration of the data distribution per experimental condition for structure, function, 
and mechanism subscores revealed six potential outlier in the four different conditions. The data was 
analyzed with and without the outliers. Appendix J additionally provides a summary of the distribution of 
structure, function, and mechanism subscores by condition.  
The table below shows the distribution of subjects included in statistical analyses. 





Structure-salient text (S) Function-salient text (F) 
 
Strategy training (Y) 19 
 
19 







CCS Mental Model Complexity 
Participants’ prior knowledge of the causal complex system was confirmed to be low (100% of the 
subjects received scores between 0-2 points on the pre-test (39 total points). As such, all analyses 
performed in this document were limited to the subjects’ post-test performance. 100% of the subjects 
correctly identified the overall function (F) of the system (creating two DNA molecules from one) on the 
post-test. This implied that the subjects had a global understanding of the complex system’s function 
(macro level).  As stated previously, the number of correct structures, associated functions and steps in 
the process extracted from graphical or verbal data as well as the overall system function scores were 
added to determine the overall mental model complexity score (39 total points possible). This score was 
expected to reflect the overall completeness and coherence of the subjects’ mental models (Chi & 
Roscoe, 2002).  
Univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to analyze the differences in the mental 
model complexity score as a function of the condition to which the subjects were assigned. Table 9 shows 
the marginal mental model complexity scores by condition: 
Table 9: CCS Mental Model Complexity Score Marginal Means  
Mean Scores Function-Salient Text (F) Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
 
Strategy Training(Y) 27.42 (6.70) 25.32 (4.96) 26.37 
 
No Strategy Training (N) 24.68 (5.55) 20.40 (7.17) 22.60 
 
Total 26.01 22.86 24.45 
 
 
The overall model was significant (F= 4.37, p= 0.007, ɳ2p= = 0.152). Both text type (F=5.19, p=0.026, ɳ2p= 
= 0.066) and strategy training (F=7.49, p=0.008, ɳ2p= =0.093) were significant predictors of the mental 
model complexity score. The interaction between the two, however did not serve as a significant predictor 














Figure 3: the Effects of Text Organization and Strategy Training on CCS Mental Model Complexity Scores 
 
  
Running the model without the outliers did not change the findings (Overall Model: F= 6.78, 
p<0.001, ɳ2p= 0.233; Text: F= 11.03, p= 0.001, ɳ2p= 0.141; Strategy: F= 8.74, p= 0.004, ɳ2p= 0.115; 
Text*Strategy: F= 0.096, p=0.757, ɳ2p= 0.001).  
The data in Table 9 implied that subjects who received strategy training and function-salient text 
reported the most complex mental models (on average 27.42 points out of 39 possible points), while the 
subjects who received structure-salient text and no envisioning training reported the least complex mental 
models (on average 20.40 points out of the 39 possible points). The mental model complexity score was 
broken down to its individual components (structure, function, and mechanism subscores) to determine 
the differential effects of text organization and strategy training on each component. Table 10 shows the 
means, ranges, and standard deviations of the mental model score as well as its individual components: 
 
Table 10:  Comparative Mental Model (sub) Scores of a CCS  
 
(Sub)score Total points possible 
 
Mean (SD) Range 
Structure Score 14 
 
9.80 (2.3) 4-13 
function Score 13 
 
8.12 (2.50) 3-13 
Mechanism Score 11 
 
5.76 (2.31) 0-10 
Function Score 1 
 
1 (0) NA 
Mental Model Complexity Score 39 
 






Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to analyze the differences in the 
structure, function, and mechanism subscores as a function of the condition to which the subjects were 
assigned. The type of text organization (structure v. function salience) and strategy training (presence v. 
absence) were used as predictors. The structure, function, and mechanism subscores served as 
dependent variables.  While the main effect of strategy training was significant (Wilks’ Lambda= 0.866, F= 
3.04, p=0.034, ɳ2p= 0.114), the main effect of text organization (Wilks’ Lambda= 0.932, F= 1.72, p= 0.170, 
ɳ2p= = 0.068) and the interaction between text and strategy (Wilks’ Lambda= 0.988, F= 0.285, p= 0.836, 
ɳ2p= = 0.012) were not significant.   
Tests of between- subjects effects showed that strategy serves as a significant predictor for all 
three mental model subscores (structure: F=5.04, p= 0.028, ɳ2p= 0.065; function: F= 4.21, p=0.44, ɳ2p= 
0.055; mechanism: F=8.04, p= 0.006, ɳ2p= 0.099). Text organization was a significant predictor of the 
structure (F= 4.19, p= 044, ɳ2p= 0.054) and function subscores (F= 3.95, p= 0.051, ɳ2p= 0.051), but did 
not significantly predict mechanism subscore (F= 3.48, p= 0.066, ɳ2p =0.045). The interaction between 
text and strategy training did not predict any of the subscores significantly (Structure: F= 0.877, p= 0.352, 
ɳ2p= 0.012; function: F= 0.410, p= 0.524, ɳ2p= 0.006; mechanism: F=0.189, p= 0.665, ɳ2p= 0.003). The 
numeric and graphic representations of these interactions are provided in the tables 11-13 and Figure 4 
below. 
 
Table 11: CCS Structure Score Marginal Means 
 
Mean Scores (SD) Function-Salient Text (F) Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
 
Strategy training (Y) 10.63 (2.31) 10.03 (2.07) 10.34 (2.18) 
 
No Strategy training (N) 9.95 (2.14) 8.39 (2.60) 9.19 (2.47) 
 
Total 10.28 (2.22) 9.22 (2.46) 9.76 
 
Table 12: CCS function Score Marginal Means 
 
Mean Scores (SD) Function-Salient Text (F) Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
 
Strategy training (Y) 9.05 (2.76) 8.26 (2.35) 8.66 (2.56) 
 
No Strategy training (N) 8.22 (2.43) 6.68 (2.73) 7.47 (2.66) 
 







Table 13: CCS Mechanism Score Marginal Means 
 
Mean Scores (SD) Function-Salient Text (F) Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
 
Strategy training (Y) 6.74 (2.21) 6.00 (1.77) 6.37 (2.00) 
 
No Strategy training (N) 5.50 (2.33) 4.32 (2.65) 4.92 (2.53) 
 
Total 6.10 (2.33) 5.16 (2.38) 5.64 
 
The data in 11, 12, and 13 confirmed that the subjects who received both envisioning training and 
function-salient text had significantly higher recall of structural, functional and mechanistic details while 
the subjects who received structure-salient texts and no envisioning strategy training recalled the least 
number of structural, functional and mechanistic details.  
 









It should be noted that analyzing the data after removing the outliers showed significant main 
effects for both strategy (Wilks’ Lambda= 0.862, F= 3.48, p=0.021, ɳ2p= 0.138) and text (Wilks’ Lambda= 
0.855, F=3.670, p=0.017, ɳ2p= 0.145). The interaction between text and strategy training was not 
statistically significant (Wilks’ Lambda= 0.989, F=0.243, ɳ2p= =0.866).  
Unlike previous findings, when dealing with this level of complexity, the novice subjects did not 
limit their strategies (learning about the complex system) to the very literal features (structures) of the 
systems (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1984; Larkin, 1983; Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004). Instead, they 
appeared to actively look for the causal relationships between the entities to uncover the implied 
sequence critical to the system’s function (Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1994; diSessa, 1993) as 
indicated by the mechanism scores.  
Near Transfer 
Questions 3 and 4 on the post-test asked that the subjects apply their newly learned knowledge 
of DNA replication machinery and process to solve real life biological problems that arise as a results of 
structural or functional defects in the system (Appendix D). The proportion of subjects who correctly 
responded to one (1 point) or both (2 points) of the transfer questions was significantly higher in groups 
who received function-salient texts than the groups who received structure-salient text (X2= 14.97, p= 
0.021) (Table 14).  
Table 14: CCS Comparative Transfer Scores by Condition 
 
Condition  
Total number of points 
 
0 1 2 Total 
Function-salient text+ strategy training 
 
1 1 16 19 
Function-salient text + NO strategy training 
 
1 0 19 20 
Structure-salient text+ strategy training 
 
6 2 11 19 
Strategy-salient text+ NO strategy training 7 0 12 19 
 
Managing Cognitive Load 
The high volume of information presented to the novice subjects as well as the high complexity of 
the linear relationships between multiple entities within the system exposed them to high germane as well 
intrinsic cognitive loads (Sweller, 1994). The novice subjects appeared to selectively attend to specific 





Craver’s (2000) definition of mechanisms as entities and associated sequential activities in which change 
is produced between set up and termination stages to the entities and actions described in tables 15 and 
16 presented an interesting pattern. Without actually having strong prior knowledge of biological concepts 
and with relatively no perceptual experience with the system, the novice subjects tended to actively 
attend to the structure (and associated actions) involved in producing change in the system, while paying 
less attention to that which was perceived peripheral to change production (set up and or termination 
steps preparing the DNA along the way to interact with various steps). These structures appear to 
correspond to the structures and steps in the sequence most critical to the system’s overall function 
suggesting the possibility that the subjects considered the system’s end product (Function) when 
attending to the structural and mechanistic details (Mayer and Moreno, 1994; Smith, diSessa, & 
Roschelle, 1994).  
Table 15: Selective Attention to A CCS Critical Structures and Their Corresponding functions 
Structure  
 
% correct structure ID % Correct function ID Role in mechanism 
The Origin(s) of Replication 1.3 1.3 Set up 
 
Replication fork 71.4 Not provided/graded Change producing 
 
Primer 71.4 44.9 Set up 
 
RNA P Enzyme 57.1 55.4 Set up 
 
SSB 89.6 84.4 Set up 
 
Nucleotides 100 94.8 Change producing 
 
H Enzyme 97.4 96.1 Change producing 
 
T Enzyme 84.4 39.0 Set up 
 
Leading Strand 75.3 40.3 Product of change 
 
Lagging Strand 77.9 39 Product of change 
 
DNA P3 85.7 81.8 Change producing 
 
DNA P1 62.3 49.2 Termination 
 
L Enzyme 67.5 61 Termination 
 









Table 16: Selective Attention to Steps Critical to Formation of CCS End Product (F) 
Step in the 
mechanism 
Event identified Identified 




1  Identification of the origin of replication 
 
1.3 Set up 
2  Separation of parent molecule strands by H enzyme 




3  Nixing the DNA to prevent supercoiling by T enzyme 
 
44.2 Set up 
4  Anchoring down of single strands by SSB proteins 
 
76.6 Set up 
5  Primer forming to mark down the spot to begin 
replication 
 
68.8 Set up 
6  Complementary base pairing leading strand 80.5 Salient 
Change 
 
7 Complementary base pairing lagging strand 35.1 Salient 
Change 
 
8 RNA H removal of RNA primers 24.7 Termination 
 
9 DNA P1 replacing the RNA primers with DNA 41.5 Termination 
 




11 Rewinding the newly replicated double helix 50.6 Termination  
 
There are two exceptions to these observations: 
1) The step in which the SSB proteins anchors the DNA single strands to prevent them from 
rejoining and ensuring the two resulting strands remain available long enough for various entities 
to enter the scene and perform their specific functions. As such, this step technically does not 
produce any change and would not be expected to be recalled by as many subjects that 
mentioned it (76.6%). Qualitative evidence provided later in the document suggests that in this 
perceptually unfamiliar environment, anchoring down the single strands to prevent them from 
rejoining might have provided the subjects with a perceptual anchor in familiar domains and have 
registered more actively than other set up and termination conditions.  
 
2) The complementary base pairing on the lagging strand is a change producing step that got 
mentioned by a little over half of the subjects (35.1%) who recognized and reported the same 





cognitive load of having to keep track of two simultaneous and distinct (replication of leading v. 
lagging strands by two distinct mechanisms and different structures) might have challenged the 
novice subjects to focus on one and not both events (Sweller, 1994).  
Note Taking Strategy Use 
All subjects were provided with a blank sheet of paper and invited to take notes if they so wished.  These 
notes were varied in amount and quality. As these notes were expected to provide insight into the 
subjects’ personal learning strategies, they were examined using the following scale: 1= blank; no notes 
were recorded; 2= notes included some words and phrases as well as some reconstruction of text and 
icons in the diagram; 3= notes included transcription of the text used to describe the system in the 
handout; most commonly used form of transcription included the paring of a structure with its 
corresponding function; and 4= in addition to transcription of definitions and reconstruction of diagrams, 
the notes included numbered lists, arrows, boxed frames to suggest attempts to learn about a process in 
its exact sequence of events (attention to mechanism). The note taking behavior resembled Collins and 
Ferguson’s (1993) epistemic games of list making with especial attention to coverage and multiplicity.  
The table below shows the proportions of different note types for various conditions. 
 











Function-salient text+ strategy training 
 
0 1 12 6 
Function-salient text + NO strategy training 
 
2 4 9 5 
Structure-salient text+ strategy training 
 
2 3 6 8 
Strategy-salient text+ NO strategy training 3 2 9 6 
 
The differences in these proportions did not appear to be statistically significant (X2= 6.74, p= 
0.664). Despite the lack of statistical significance, it is important to note that many subjects appeared to 
have attempted “to transfer” the original list to other epistemic games by remaking the lists to indicate that 
the list implied a “process” as well as making shorter and more sophisticated lists with graphics to 






Range of Written Responses 
The subjects’ written answers showed a wide range of depth and details. Some examples are 
provided below. Subject 001, who received envisioning strategy training and a structure-salient text did 
not provide any names of structures. Instead, the functions are inserted in the diagram as labels to 
capture both function and structure (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Subject 001 Representation of CCS 
 
 
Many others, including subject 014 depicted a picture of the double stranded DNA and superimpose 
textboxes including names of structures and their associated functions (Figure 6). The interview results 
for this group of subjects were mixed. Some articulated an effective understanding of the mechanism 
(sequence of required steps) the system uses to replicate DNA, while others’ mental models remained 
limited to the structures and functions marked on the written responses (not much understanding of 













Figure 6: Subject 014 Representation of CCS 
 
Subject 016 has reconstructed the information in such a way that arrows are used to indicate the 
sequences of steps between specific structures with their corresponding functions (Figure 7). This 
reconstruction did not include any pictorial depiction of the DNA molecule or the other actors that interact 
with it to facilitate the process.  
 













Others numbered either pictures or lists to indicate the required sequence of steps (Figures 8 and 9).  
 



















Figure 10: Subject 027 Representation of CCS 
Several subject used arrows to indicate the sequence of causal relations with more elaborate drawings 
(Figure 10), while others used frames to imply different stages or phases within the process (Figure 11). 
 
 









Consistnet with previous reports, many subjects reported using analogies to aid in mental model 
development as apparente in both written and verbal responses (Clement, 1988). Subject 071 has drawn 
a glue gun to refer to the L enzyme (which functions to ligate (glue) smaller fragments of newly produced 
DNA to make bigger strands), and conceptualized proteins that bind single strands of DNA (SSB proteins) 
to anchor it down to prevent it from binding their sister strands as literal weights (Figure 12). The H 
enzyme has additionally been depicted as a zipper opening up the paired bases of the double helix. 
When asked to articulate the system’s function in a step by step manner, subjects referred to DNA as two 
sides of a zipper, ladder, or braided hair). The SSB protein anchors were likened to push pins or more 
dramatically, family members who prevented them from finding their way to their romantic partners.  
 
Figure 12. Subject 071 representation of CCS 
 
Gender 
 Despite the potential gender differences in visuospatial or synthesizing ability, given that the 
experiment group was largely female (75%), no analyses were performed to study gender-based 
differences in mental model constructions of CCS (Linn & Petersen, 1985; Focquaert, Steven, Wolford, 







Those who received envisioning training were asked to compare the experience of envisioning of 
the bicycle pump and enzyme function (training systems) to DNA replication machinery (experimental 
system) at the end of the session. The great majority (37 out of 40 envisioning trained subjects) reported 
finding it is easier to envision the pump as they used prior (often actual) experience with the pump to help 
with the envisioning process (Barsalou, 1999). The other 3 reported finding the enzyme system easiest to 
envision as it contained the fewest steps.  Whether the simpler physical (pump) or biological systems 
(enzyme) or the highly complex linear causal system under discussion, the quantitative findings and 
interview corroborated findings from other studies that showed people actively form mental models from 
static text and diagrams and can simulate action from static images (Hegarty, Just and Morrison, 1988; 
Hegarty, 1992; Hegarty and Just, 1993; Mayer, 1997; Mayer, 2005; Schwartz & Black, 1996). The 
subjects often used gesture to reenact the process by which the pump or enzyme functions. Many 
gestured pulling the pump piston up and down when describing the pump, implying a potential for 
embodiment of the pump’s action. They unanimously reported envisioning the DNA replication system 
considerably more difficult than either bicycle pump or enzyme as they found it difficult to keep up with the 
number of structures and relationships in the system. Many who did not receive envisioning training 
reported having at least partially envisioned the process. This report was most pronounced for the 
separation of the DNA strands by the Helicase enzyme. Many subjects gesticulated the unwinding/ 
opening up of the DNA double helix by the enzyme using their arms as DNA strands during interviews.  
A common report amongst those who envisioned (trained or spontaneous envisioners) was that 
“the movie” of the system would be most fluid and vivid at the very beginning (strands splitting by the 
action of the H enzyme) and the very end (newly formed double helices twisting back around each other 
as the different parts of the system separated. The middle processes (dual elongation pathways for the 
different sister strands) were mostly reported as static images (“there was too much going on”).  
Those who were not trained on the envisioning strategy reported using a wide range of learning 
strategies, including: 1) reading the beginning and end paragraphs as if the handout were a GRE 
passage; 2) reading and rereading to make sense of the topic (without strategizing); 3) clustering 





handout was describing a process and trying to imagine what the process would look like (partial to 
complete spontaneous envisioning). Subjects reported three main strategies of interacting with the text 
and the diagram:  
1) Read the text in its entirety without looking at the diagram, and subsequently comparing the 
diagram provided in the handout with the image they had constructed in their own minds from the 
text to improve their mental models. 
2) Read the text and referred to the diagram (going back and forth between the text and the diagram 
from the very beginning) to learn about DNA replication. 
3) A small minority reported having bypassed the diagram as they found it too complex and 
confusing (relied on text only). 
Subjects also reported explicit attempts to rehearse reconstructed notes after initial interactions with text 
and diagrams using one of the approaches below: 
1) Spotted a process (sequence) during the initial interaction with the handout and attempted to 
reconstruct the steps in the process (through envisioning or enumerating the steps) to improve 
mental models. They often took their own notes for enumerating lists of action steps and 
delineating the mechanism (arrows, frames, etc.).  
2) Feeling overwhelmed by the sheer volume of the information to be learned, they transcribed 
definitions (structures and their corresponding actions) and created their own notes, which they 
reviewed to learn the material. What they recalled on the post-test was technically the 
reconstruction from their own notes rather than the material from the instructional handout (text 
+diagram). 
3) All subjects reported having reread the text partially or fully (and many reported having 
reexamined the diagram) multiple times to make sense of the information. 
Conclusion 
The results confirmed the first two hypotheses. Envisioning training and changing the 
organization of text such that it would make function of structures more salient resulted in improvement in 





(Figure 4). The third hypothesis was refuted as visuospatial reasoning indices (shape memory and paper 
folding scores) did not serve as effective covariates and were ultimately removed from all analyses. 
Further studies are required to determine what if any (other) measures of visuospatial or verbal ability 
might contribute to the individual differences in mental model complexity of CCS. The fourth hypothesis 
was also refuted as the interaction between strategy training and text organization did not significantly 
improve mental model complexity or subscores (Figures 3 and 4). 
Qualitative analyses reviewed additional insight into differences and similarities between mental 
models of CCS and other complex systems. Similar to previous findings, the novice subjects’ recall 
performance of a CCS at the molecular level stressed structure, over function and mechanism (Table 10). 
The results shown in tables 15 and 16 provided evidence for the possibility that subjects coped with the 
complexity-based cognitive load by reducing the number of structures and steps in the mechanism to 






CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENT 2 
THE EFFECTS OF AND ENVISIONING STRATEGY TRAINING AND TEXT ORGANIZATION ON 




Findings from the preliminary study suggested that increasing complexity had the potential to 
adversely affect people’s ability to effectively form mental models of functionally coupled complex 
systems. Just how complex is too complex? How might increasing complexity affect people’s use of 
cognitive strategies to learn and reason about systems?   
While conserving the lack of perceptual experience with the system (a potential contributor to 
complexity), the second study aimed to increase complexity in two distinct ways: 1) increasing the number 
of structures and causal relationships between them; and 2) introducing a functional connection between 
two individually complex systems such that the entire assembly of the second system (which generates 
the ultimate product of the systems’ coupling) would depend on the product of first system. To that end, a 
set of functionally coupled molecular systems were selected to expand upon the findings in experiment 1.  
 
Research Question 
This study aimed to explore people’s mental models of functionally coupled causal complex systems 
(FC-CCS) and determine whether they differed from mental models of other complex systems studied to 
date. Specifically, the experiment was designed to answer the following research question: Does text 
organization and or teaching people to use the envisioning strategy (simulating the function of the 
system) affect people’s mental models of FC-CCS? 
 
Hypotheses 
1) Training subjects to use the envisioning strategy by which they learn to simulate the function of 
the system would significantly improve the subjects’ FC-CCS mental model complexity (MCC). As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, mental model complexity score was defined as the sum of 
knowledge about structures and their associated functions, the mechanism, and the overall 





2) Using a function-salient text organization (v. structure salient text) would improve the subjects’ 
FC-CCS mental model complexity score.  
3) Visuospatial abilities measured by shape memory and paper folding scores would significantly 
predict people’s FC-CCS mental model complexity scores. The higher the visuospatial abilities, 
the higher the FC-CCS mental model complexity score. 
4) There would be a significant and positive interaction between text organization and envisioning 
strategy training. The subjects assigned to the function-salient text+ strategy training condition 
would have the highest FC-CCS mental model complexity score, while the subjects assigned to 
the structure-salient text+ no strategy training would have the lowest FC-CCS mental model 
complexity score. 
Rationale for the Selection of the Biological System 
The DNA transcription and RNA translation systems were selected as the coupled complex 
systems for this experiment.  The rationale for the system selection is as follows: The coupling between 
DNA transcription and protein translation systems is organized in at least two different levels, described in 
greater detail below (Jacobson, 2001):  
a. The macro level in which a gene within DNA is transcribed into a messenger molecule 
(RNA), which carries DNA’s genetic instructions to the cytoplasm where the instructions 
get translated into proteins (DNA Messenger RNA protein). The formation of the 
messenger molecule servers as the connection between the two systems.  
b. The micro level, which focuses on the specific molecular structures and (breaking and 
formation of) chemical bonds between various entities within each system. The coupled 
systems included 25 structures that participated in 19 different steps to form the end 










A 2*2 factorial design was used to set up the study, in which each factor contained two levels. 
Half of the participants received instruction and training to envision while learning about the coupled 
complex systems (strategy training). The other half reviewed the instructional material, but did not receive 
training or instruction to envision while learning (no strategy training). Similarly, half of the participants 
received a stimulus in which the text organization made the structures within the system salient, while the 
other half received a stimulus in which the function of various components was made salient using the 
reorganization of the sentences. As such, with the exception of sentence order, the information presented 
and sentences used in both versions of the text were nearly identical.  




Structure-salient text (S) 
 
Function-salient text (F) 
Strategy training (Y) Received training to envision. 
Received a structure-salient text. 
 
Received training to envision. 
Received a function-salient text. 
No Strategy training 
(N) 
Did not receive training to envision. 
Received a structure-salient text. 
Did not receive training to envision. 




80 graduate students (Teachers College, Columbia University) with no or low prior knowledge of 
the RNA transcription and protein translation machineries (high school biology) participated in the study 
(87.5% female, 12.5% male). Participants were offered 10 $/ hour (20 $ total).  The recruitment 
announcement on TC portal made the requirement of low prior knowledge of the topic explicit. Moreover, 
the participants were provided with a pretest to determine any prior knowledge that could affect the study 
outcome. A random number generator (GraphPad) was used to pre-assign the subjects to the 
aforementioned conditions randomly.  
Study Session Agenda 
I met with the subjects individually in the Teachers College Gottesman Library independent study 







Event Number of Minutes 
Pretest 5 
Consent process 10 
ETS shape memory test  10 
ETS paper folding test 10 
Pre-training (Review of DNA structure handout)  5 
Review of strategy training material 10 
Strategy training (varied by condition) 10 
Presentation of the stimulus (Transcription and translation handout)  30 
Posttest/ interview 30  
Total session time 120 minutes 
 
After a comprehensive consent process, all participants were presented with the pre-test, the 
1976 Educational Testing Services (ETS)’s Cognitive Factor Kit instruments for shape memory and paper 
folding tests, and the pre-training session to review the DNA structure before learning about how it could 
be transcribed (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Derman, 1976). As such, the first 40 minutes of all sessions 
were identical independently of the condition to which participants were randomly assigned.  
Materials and Procedures 
All subjects were presented with the Shape Memory and Paper Folding components of the 1976 
ETS Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests to determine the subjects’ visuospatial abilities (Ekstrom, 
French, Harman, & Derman, 1976). For pre-training, all subjects were provided with a handout titled 
Structure of the DNA Molecule (Appendix A), which provides an overview of the two strands of DNA, as 
well as the four different types of nucleotides and the specific pairing possible between them.  Having 
completed the DNA structure pre-training, the subjects were presented with two handouts sequentially, 
one with 8 frames depicting the inner workings of a bicycle pump (physical system), and another with a 
diagram of an enzyme’s lock and key model of action (biological system).  
The two groups that received envisioning training received the following additional paragraph of 
text that described the process of envisioning as a strategy (deKleer & Brown, 1982): 
Envisioning is a problem solving strategy by which you use your knowledge of the 
system’s structure and relationships between structures to simulate the function of the 
system in your mind. To use the envisioning strategy, you should first build a model of all 
structures within the system. Once you have an adequate understanding of the 
structures, you can examine the relationships between the structures. Questions you 
might ask yourself to help you build the structural and relational models are: 1) what does 
each structure do?;  2) what are the different states in which each structure can exist 
within the system?; and 3) Can a change in a structure’s state affect a change in other 
structures in the system? Please review these handouts and practice envisioning how a 
bicycle pump works to pump air into a tire and how enzymes facilitate chemical reactions. 
Your ultimate goal is to see movement of all parts of the system that can move in your 






The subjects in the other two groups that did not receive envisioning training simply were asked 
to learn about the inner workings of a bicycle pump and the lock and key model of enzyme function (they 
were not provided the paragraph above). To confirm that the subjects provided with envisioning strategy 
indeed were able to envision the processes, I asked them to recite the inner working of the pump and 
enzyme from memory. It was confirmed that all subjects’ envisioning included “movement” of the different 
components of systems before proceeding to the next step of the experiment. The subjects in the no 
strategy training group received additional minutes of review time with the pump and enzyme handouts to 
ensure all subjects experienced identical time laps between the presentation of the DNA pertaining 
handout and the instructional stimuli detailed below.  
Depending on their randomly assigned conditions, the subjects received either a structure-salient 
or a function-salient handout describing RNA transcription and protein synthesis (Appendices F & G). 
Once again, I chose a static, pre-labeled diagram of the DNA replication process and text to introduce as 
the instructional material and “weeded” out all details that would compete with the content for the 
subjects’ attention (Mayer, Hegarty, Mayer, & Campbell, 2005; Hegarty, Kriz, and Cate, 2003; Mayer & 
Moreno, 2003).  As mentioned in experiment 1, I consulted expert overviews as a guide to gauge the 
level of structural and mechanistic details to include in instructional material (Clancy, 2008; Clancy & 
Brown, 2008). The subjects were provided one 8.5x11 sheet of blank paper to use for optional note taking 
and were reminded of the post-test and the interview to follow the period of learning about DNA 
replication. The subjects in the strategy training groups were asked to use the envisioning strategy on 
which they had just received training to learn how proteins are produced from DNA. The subjects in the 
no strategy training groups were asked to use whatever strategies they usually used to learn science to 
learn how proteins are produced from DNA. Following post-test, a brief interview was conducted in which 
the subjects were asked to elaborate on their experience and recall the step by step process by which 
proteins are made from DNA (Appendix H). The study session, interview transcription, post-test scoring 









I used the Structure, function, Mechanism, and Function (SfMF) framework to score the post-tests 
and interview transcripts. Mention of each correct structure, its corresponding function or the specific step 
in the mechanism received 1 point. For example, the written response “…then you get rid of introns and 
you keep the exons [be]cause introns don’t code for anything…” received two points for correct 
identification of introns and exons (structures), two points for local functions of introns and exons (not 
coding and coding for proteins respectively), and one point for mechanism as indicated by the knowledge 
of the splicing of the transcript (“get rid of introns”) used to convert the transcript to messenger RNA . A 
detailed scoring rubric is provided in Appendix I. No penalties were assigned to incorrect answers. 
Previous studies have typically used the utterances and or written responses to “interpret the quality” or 
“categorize” the different mental models demonstrated by subjects (Chi, Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 
1994; Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004). The subjective natures of such interpretation or categorization efforts 
required establishing agreement between at least two raters. No such interpretation or categorization took 
place in this study. Instead, I scored the written responses and interview transcripts for the presence or 
absence of correct mentions to structures, functions, and mechanism steps. Though I allowed for 
individual differences in graphical and verbal expressions to identify the correct answers, there could only 
be one correct answer per item mentioned in the scoring rubric provided in Appendix I. 
Results 
80 subjects were randomly assigned to four different conditions using the GraphPad random 
number generator. The data from 6 subjects were ultimately excluded from the analysis as the post-test 
interviews indicated the possibility that they had reached an impasse too early in the learning process to 
merit a meaningful investigation of their mental models.  
To account for the influences of individual differences in visuospatial abilities, the participants’ 
shape memory (SM) and paper folding (PF) scores (ETS 1976 Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests) 
were used as covariates, while text and strategy assignments were used as factors.  Similar to the 
findings in experiment 1, analyses revealed that SM and PF worsened the overall model and did not 
serve as effective covariates. As such, they were excluded from further analyses. A summary of this 





structure, function, and mechanism subscores revealed five potential outliers for all subscores in the four 
different conditions. The data was analyzed with and without the covariates and outliers. The different 
models (with or without outliers) are discussed in the following sections to provide a context for 
interpreting the influences of each factor on FC-CCS mental model complexity. The table below shows 
the final number of subjects that were included in statistical analyses for this experiment. 




Structure-salient text (S) Function-salient text (F) 
Strategy training (Y) 
 
18 18 
No Strategy training (N) 19 19 
 
FC-CCS Mental Model Complexity 
100% of the subjects received a zero on the mental model score of the pre-test. As such, 
analyses performed in this document are limited to the subjects’ post-test performance. Unlike the first 
experiment in which the system’s overall function was correctly identified by all subjects, 10 subjects 
(13%) did not provide the correct response to the first question on the post-test about the purpose of the 
coupled systems, formation of proteins from DNA. To examine the quality of the subjects’ mental models 
of the FC-CCS, the second question asked the subjects to identify all structures (and their associated 
functions) involved in the machineries that produce proteins from DNA. In addition, following completion 
of the post-test, the subjects were briefly interviewed and were invited to elaborate on the process by 
which protein is produced from DNA step by step. The number of correct structures, associated functions 
and steps in the process extracted from either verbal or graphical responses were added to determine the 
mental model complexity score (69 total points; Kaplan & Black, 2003). This score was expected to reflect 
the completeness and coherence of the subjects’ mental models (Chi & Roscoe, 2002).  
Univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to analyze the differences in mental 
model complexity score as a function of the conditions to which the subjects were assigned. The type of 
text organization (structure v. function salience) and strategy training (presence v. absence) were used as 
predictors. The mental model complexity score served as the dependent variable. The table below shows 






Table 20: FC-CCS Mental Model Complexity Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores 
 
Function-Salient Text (F) Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy Training (Y) 
 
30.39 (8.88) 25.17 (8.87) 27.78 (9.14) 
No Strategy Training (N) 
 
20.95 (8.13) 22.79 (9.28) 21.87 (8.65) 
Total 25.54 (9.65) 23.95 (9.04) 24.82 
 
The overall model was significant (F= 3.98, p=0.011, ɳ2p= 0.146). While strategy training was a 
significant predictors of the mental model complexity score (F= 8.34, p=0.005, ɳ2p= 0.106), text 
organization did not significantly predict mental model complexity score (F= 0.682, p=0.412, ɳ2p= 0.010). 
The interaction between text and strategy was not significant (F= 2.98, p= 0.089, ɳ2p= 0.041).  
 





Excluding the variables from the model resulted in different findings: The overall model was 
statistically significant (F= 7.95, p< 0.001). While the influences of strategy training (F= 16.42, p< 0.001) 
as text organization (F= 1.07, p=0.306) on mental model complexity remained as previously stated, the 
interaction between text organization and strategy training became statistically significant (F= 7.84, 
p=0.007).  
The mental model complexity score was broken down to its individual components (structure, 





training on each component. Table 20 below shows the means, ranges, and standard deviations of the 
mental model score as well as its individual components: 
Table 21:  Comparative FC-CCS Mental Model (sub) Scores  
(Sub)score Total points possible 
 
Mean (SD) Range 
Structure Score 25 
 
10.83 (3.3) 4-18 
function Score 24 
 
6.45 (3.5) 0-14 
Mechanism Score 19 
 
6.60 (3.4) 0-16 
Function Score 1 
 
0.87 (0.3) 0-1 
Mental Model Score 69 24.7 (9.3) 6-48 
 
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to analyze the differences in the 
structure, function, and mechanism subscores as a function of the conditions to which the subjects were 
assigned. The type of text organization (structure v. function salience) and strategy training (presence v. 
absence) were used as predictors. The structure, function, and mechanism subscores served as 
dependent variables. In the overall model, strategy training was the only significant predictor of the 
differences in mental model subscores (Wilks’ Lambda= 0.838, F=4.40, p=0.007, ɳ2p= 0.162).  Text 
organization was a not a significant predictor for mental model complexity score (Wilks’ Lambda= 0.975, 
p= 0.632, ɳ2p= 0.025). The interaction between text and strategy was not significant (Wilks’ Lambda= 
0.953, F=1.12, p=0.348, ɳ2p= 0.047). Strategy training served as a significant predictor of structural (F= 
6.13, p=0.016, ɳ2p= 0.081), functional (F=4.21, p=0.044, ɳ2p= 0.057), and mechanistic subscores 
(F=11.74, p=0.001, ɳ2p= 0.144). Text organization did not serve as a significant predictor for any of the 
structural (F= 0.490, p=0.486, ɳ2p= 0.007), functional (F=1.23, p=0.271, ɳ2p= 0.017), and mechanistic 
subscores (F=0.112, p=0.739, ɳ2p= 0.002). The interactions between text and strategy training were not 
significant for either structural (F=2.42, p=0.125, ɳ2p= 0.033), functional (F=3.40, p=0.070, ɳ2p= 0.046), 
and mechanistic (F=1.65, p=0.203, ɳ2p= 0.023). Running the model without outliers provided similar 
interpretations for strategy training and text organization. The interactions between text and strategy 
training were significant for structural (F=6.80, p=0.011, ɳ2p= 0.95), functional (F=7.59, p=0.008, ɳ2p= 
0.105), and mechanistic (F=4.07, p=0.048, ɳ2p= 0.059) when the outliers were excluded. Tables 22-24 





Table 22: FC-CCS Structure Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores 
 
Function-Salient Text (F) Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy training (Y) 
 
12.6 (3.13) 10.94 (2.84) 11.78 (3.06) 
No Strategy training (N) 
 
9.63 (3.29) 10.26 (3.41) 9.95 (3.32) 
Total 
 
11.08 (3.51) 10.60 (3.12) 10.86 
 
Table 23: FC-CCS function Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores 
 
Function-Salient Text (F) Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy training (Y) 
 
8.44 (3.42) 6.11 (3.55) 7.28 (3.63) 
No Strategy training (N) 
 
5.37 (2.69) 5.95 (3.84) 5.66 (3.28) 
Total 
 
6.86 (3.40) 6.03  (3.65) 6.47 
 
Table 24: FC-CCS Mechanism Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores 
 
Function-Salient Text (F) Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy training (Y) 
 
8.44 (3.20) 7.28 (3.16) 7.86 (3.19) 
No Strategy training (N) 
 
5.05 (3.22) 5.74 (2.79) 5.39 (2.99) 
Total 6.70 (3.60) 6.49 (3.03) 6.63 
 
 











Managing Cognitive Load 
The high volume of information presented to the novice learners as well as the high complexity of 
the linear relationships between multiple entities within the system exposed the subjects to high germane 
as well intrinsic cognitive loads respectively (Sweller, 1994). Without prior knowledge of biological 
concepts and with no perceptual experience with the system, the novice subjects tended to actively 
attend to the structure (and associated actions) involved in producing change in the system, while paying 
less attention to that which was perceived peripheral to change production (set up and or termination 
steps preparing the DNA or its message along the way to interact with various entities along the causal 
chain (Machamer, Darden, and Craver, 2000). This observation, depicted in table 17 confirmed the 
observations in experiment 1 (Table 16). 
Table 25: Selective Attention to Steps Critical to Formation of FC-CCS End Product (F)  
Step in the 
mechanism 
Event identified Identified 





1  Identification and binding of the gene 20.3 
 
Set up 
2  Unwinding DNA to reach the gene 64.9 Salient 
change 
 
3  Transcribing the gene 75.7 Salient 
change 
 
4  Terminating transcription 14.9 Termination 
 
5  Separating the transcript from DNA 14.9 Termination 









7 Translocating the message to the cytoplasm 35.1 Set up 
 
8 Forming an initiation complex 29.7 Set up 
 
9 Ribosome binding the message 12.2 Set up 
 
10 First transfer RNA entering with first amino acid 32.4 Set up 
 
11 Second transfer RNA entering with second amino 
acid 
 
21.6 Set up 
12 Matching correct code to corresponding amino acid 58.1 Salient 
change 
 
13 Two amino acids binding 37.8 Salient 
change 
 
14 Ribosome moving over the mRNA to read it 31.1 Salient 
change 
 
15 Transfer RNA shifting within ribosome 23.0 Termination 
 
16 Transfer RNA leaving the ribosome 37.8 Termination 
 
17 11-16 repeating 29.7 Salient 
change 
 
18 Reaching the stop codon- termination of translation 48.6 Termination 
 
19 Release of protein 16.2 Termination 
 
Given that there were approximately twice the number of steps involved in the mechanism of FC-
CCS used in experiment 2 when compared to the CCS in experiment 1, there were twice as many points 
of salient change for the subjects to which I hypothesized they would selectively attend. As such, many 
points of change within the mechanism of action, including some conducive to visualization (i.e. step 14) 
were missed by a large number of subjects (Table 25). Still, it is important to note that all steps which at 
least 50% of the subjects identified correctly corresponded to change producing steps in the mechanism. 
The findings from this experiment confirmed the findings from experiment 1 to corroborate the hypothesis 
that faced with complexity, people cope with cognitive load by focusing their attention (and subsequently 
initial mental models) on only the causally and functionally salient aspects of the systems at the expense 







Near Transfer  
Despite the considerable effects of envisioning training on improvements observed for all 
subscores that comprise FC-CCS mental models, the subjects who received envisioning training did not 
show a significant difference in applying the information to solve problems about the coupled systems 
(X2= 7.87, p= 0.248). The explanation might lie in the fact that near transfer questions as asked in the 
post-test (“what if”) can technically be reasoned about without the requirement for envisioning the 
systems’ actions. For example, the first transfer question asked the subjects to predict what would 
happen to the functionally coupled systems if there were a mutation in a (insulin) gene. In retrospect, this 
question can be answered in two distinct ways: 1) running the system from the top in one’s mind’s eye to 
determine all the steps and intermediate products that would be affected by the mutation; or 2) reasoning 
from the central dogma developed from the overall understanding of the systems’ functional coupling 
(DNA mRNA Protein) to determine that a(n) (adverse) change in the DNA would result in a(n) 
(adverse) change in the protein whose production relies on the instructions from the DNA.  Review of the 
subjects’ written responses suggested that many might have utilized the latter. As such, the transfer 
questions might have failed in adequately eliciting a need to use imagistic models. More sophisticated 
problem solving scenarios (and far transfers) will be required to truly engage the subjects’ envisioning 
skills and investigate its effect on problem solving effectiveness.  
Table 26: FC-CCS Comparative Proportion of Transfer Scores  
Condition 0 points 1 point 2 points Total 
Function-salient text+ strategy training 
 
0 4 15 19 
Function-salient text + NO strategy training 
 
6 3 10 19 
Structure-salient text+ strategy training 
 
2 4 14 18 
Strategy-salient text+ NO strategy training 4 3 12 19 
 
Note Taking Strategy Use 
All subjects were provided with a blank sheet of paper and invited to take notes if they so wished.  
These notes were varied in amount and quality. As these notes were expected to provide insight into the 
subjects’ personal learning strategies, and were examined using the following scale: 1= blank; no notes 
were recorded; 2= notes included some words and phrases as well as some reconstruction of icons in the 





commonly used form of transcription included the paring of a structure with its corresponding function; 4= 
in addition to transcription of definitions and reconstruction of diagrams, the notes included numbered 
lists, arrows, boxed frames to suggest attempts to learn about a process in its exact sequence of events 
(attention to mechanism).The table below shows the proportions of different note types for various 
conditions. 












Function-salient text+ strategy training 
 
1 4 11 2 
Function-salient text + NO strategy training 
 
0 8 10 1 
Structure-salient text+ strategy training 
 
0 11 6 1 
Strategy-salient text+ NO strategy training 0 12 6 1 
 
The differences in these proportions were not statistically significant (X2= 10.63, p= 0.302). 
Similar to the findings from experiment 1, many subjects appeared to have attempted “to move” from the 
original lists made by remaking the lists to imply that the list implied a “process” as well as making shorter 
and more sophisticated lists (Collins and Ferguson, 1993). 
Gender 
 Despite the potential gender differences in visuospatial or synthesizing ability, given that the 
experiment group was largely female (>85%), no analyses were performed to study gender-based 
differences in mental model constructions of CCS (Linn & Petersen, 1985; Focquaert, Steven, Wolford, 
Colden, & Gazzaniga, 2007).  
 
Interviews 
The subjects’ written answers showed a wide range of depth and details. Some examples are 
provided below. Subjects who were trained to envision the coupled systems often reported that for the 
most part they successfully animated the movements of structures and development of products, but the 
middle segment, the part of the mechanism in which the RNA gets spliced was seen as a static image. A 





movement of cutting the introns out with a pair of scissors or a paper cutter; and 2) the messenger 
molecule travelling through a machine (i.e. meat grinder) and coming out with its introns removed at the 
other end.  
 
In addition, several subjects in the envisioning training groups as well as a few who did not receive any 
such training reported the frame by frame diagrammatic representation of the second system (protein 
translation steps seen in Appendices F and G) in the handout was readily conducive to simulating its 
function. 
Other analogies were reported in interviews. One subject reported “seeing” the reading of the 
messenger RNA by the ribosome as “Ziploc. The ribosome and incoming tRNAs with amino acids are like 
the rectangular piece of plastic of the Ziploc that moves over the mRNA (left to right) in the middle and 
reads it and protein comes out on the other end.” Another subject likened translation of proteins from 
mRNA to “running a [computer] program from the RNA code.” One subject likened tRNA to a helicopter 
that delivers amino acids to the scene. Another likened the (3-letter) codon-anticodon binding to a 3-
pronged electric plug: 
… the beautiful thing about the ribosome is that it has these other 3 containers like a 
plug, which is A which monitors if Ts plug can fit into the electric plug [referring to the 
codon-anticodon match], and if it doesn’t, if any of the prongs is wrong [referring to a 
mismatch], I see electricity coming out and it is out of there. 
 
These examples served as evidence that subjects at times animated analogies with familiar 
objects and situations to reason about the novel complex systems with which they had no prior 
experience.  Overall, subjects reported experiencing difficulty in envisioning the coupled system’s 
function citing the reasons below: 
1- High intrinsic cognitive load (number of agents and relations): “There was too much going 
on and I couldn’t keep up.” 
2- Inability to form the full causal model before animating it (deKleer and Brown, 1982):  “I 
tried to understand the process, but didn’t understand some of it.” 
3- Inability to visualize that with which they had no previous perceptual experience: “I tried 
visualizing it, but I have never seen this before, so it was bunch of shapes, floating 





from? They are just there? Because you told me to envision, it seemed like in my video 
they were just flying in, but I couldn’t tell where they were coming from. 
Range of Written Responses 
The written responses were highly varied in the amount of detail and accuracy of structural, 
behavioral, and mechanistic components of both systems and the interconnection between them. Subject 
083 has effectively synthesized the core functions and mechanism of the coupled systems in favor of 
skipping over many structural, functional, and mechanistic details (special attention is paid to capture in a 
sentence or two how the intermediate and ultimate products are formed). This response effectively 












Subject 084 has reconstructed the entire process into three stages. This is impressive because the 
instructional handout provided them with three steps per each of transcription and translation processes. 
The staging in the response copied below is an entirely novel reconstruction and requires a coherent (but 





Figure 16: Subject 084 Representation of FC-CCS
 










Several subjects provided information on one and not both systems (Figure 18). Subject 89’s response is 





Figure 18: Subject 089 Representation of FC-CCS 
 
 
Subject 129 (Figure 19) on the other hand focused attention on the second system only (with virtually no 
mention of the first, whose product sets the template for the second system assembly, as if the 






Figure 19: Subject 129 Representation of FC-CCS
 
 
Several subjects have told the story in the most functionally minimalistic way (highly coherent, but very 
incomplete mental models) (Figure 20). 







The results confirmed the first hypothesis as strategy training improved mental model complexity 
score, as well as structural, functional and mechanistic mental model subscores significantly. Though text 
was not a significant predictor of mental model completeness and coherence, at least one analysis 
(without outliers) showed the interaction between text and strategy training to be significant for all three 
subscores. In other words, strategy training when learning about functionally coupled causal complex 
systems could be most useful when the novice subjects received function-salient texts. 
In addition, while the subjects’ mental models contained more structural than functional elements, 
the majority correctly identified the overall purpose of the coupled systems (production of proteins) as well 
as stressed the point of functional coupling (product of the first system serving as the substrate for the 
second system) as functional elements in their mental model. Similar to findings from the first experiment, 
paying selective attention to change producing steps at the expense of regulatory or preparatory was 






CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
Experiments 1 and 2 described in previous chapters were designed to determine the 
characteristics of mental models of causal complex natural systems and the influences of envisioning 
strategy training and text organization on their development. 
 Similar to previous findings by Hmelo-Silver’s team (2004; 2007), the novice subjects’ mental 
models of CCS and FC-CCS emphasized structural elements over behavioral (mechanistic) and 
functional elements (Table 28). The proposed framework (SfMF) distinguished between the local function 
of structures (f) and the formation of the systems’ end products (F). For both CCS and FC-CCS, the 
subjects appeared to struggle with recalling the correct functions of individual structures (at 57.6% and 
27% respectively), but offered correct responses for the overall systems’ function (at 100 and 87% 
respectively). The subjects who did not correctly identify the overall function of the coupled systems 
generally reported information about only one of the systems, while nearly completely bypassing the 
other. Given their failure to identify the functional coupling between the two systems, they received zero 
points for the overall function knowledge (F). Moreover, the increase in complexity from CCS to FC-CCS 
(two-fold), reduced the number of structural (from 69.7% to 43.4%), functional (from 57.6% to 27.0), and 
mechanistic (from 51.3% to 349%) elements reported by the subjects. Increase in complexity also 
affected the subjects’ understanding of the overall function of the system(s) as only 87% of the subjects 
correctly identified the overall function of the coupled systems v. the 100% of the subjects who correctly 
identified the overall function of CCS. It is important to note that the analyses in this document do not lend 
themselves to statistically comparing the differences in different subscores across the two systems. While 
it would be plausible to compare the total mental model complexity as a percentage of the total possible 
points mathematically, the cognitive nature of the tasks performed to obtain the score were expected to 
be different given that twice the mental operations were expected in the same amount of time. 
Differences in mental model complexity scores might be explained in variations in three sets of scores 
(structural, functional, and mechanistic knowledge or error). As such, table 28 provides an overview of 
differences of mental models between the two systems without any reference to the statistical robustness 


























CCS 9.76 (69.7%) 8.06 (57.6%) 5.64 (51.3%) 1 (100%) 24.45 (62.7%) 
 
FC-CCS 10.86 (43.4%) 6.47 (27.0%) 6.63 (34.9%) 0.870 (87%) 24.82 (36.0%) 
 
 In learning about both types of complex systems, training the subjects to envision the system’s 
function significantly improved their knowledge of the systems’ structures (p=0.028; p=0.016) and their 
associated functions (p=0.044; p=0.044) as well as the mechanisms (p=0.006; p= 0.001) that established 
the chains of causality (Table 29). Function-salient text significantly improved knowledge ofstructure 
(p=0.044) and function (p=0.051) in the single causal complex system, but did not significantly affect 
understanding of mechanism in CCS, or any of the structure, function, or mechanism in the coupled 
systems (Table 29). The interaction between the text organization and strategy training were also not 
significant for either system.    
Table 29: Effects of Strategy Training and Text Organization on Mental Model Subscores by System Type 
System Subscore Strategy Training Text Organization Strategy Training  













function p= 0.044 
ɳ2p=0.054 
 




































The effect sizes for the significant findings as indicated by partial Eta Squared indices (ɳ2p) are 
relatively small. Envisioning strategy training appears to have the largest effect on understanding of 





The reports of correlations between individual differences in spatial ability (paper folding score) 
and mechanical ability informed the inclusion of paper folding score as a covariate in the analyses 
(Hegarty, 1992; Mayer & Sims, 1994). Given the large number of structures included in the diagrams form 
which the subjects learned about the systems, I also included the ETS shape memory score to account 
for the differential ability with which subjects could keep up with storing information about various shapes 
in their short term memory. Neither paper folding score nor the shape memory score served as good 
covariates for the analyses and were removed from final analyses and reporting. This may be explained 
in two ways:  
1- The shape memory test tasks the subjects with remembering clusters of shapes in an otherwise 
meaningless (devoid of any real life context) background. Though the subjects were required to 
keep a large number of shapes in their working memory, the shapes were icons representing 
structures with a dynamic system in the context provided in the handout. The context provided a 
potentially ameliorating effect on the challenge of keeping track of multiple structures (and 
corresponding icons) in mind.  
2- Though the systems studied in this document are dynamic (structures moving in space, 
compartmentalizing the space for assembly of specific system parts at any given time), the spatial 
changes in the systems may not have been adequately captured in the dimensions of spatial 
ability that is measured by ETS paper folding test (i.e. rotation of structures within the system). 
 
The choices of DNA replication system as the causal complex system (CCS) in experiment 1 and 
the transcription + translation systems as the functionally coupled causal complex systems (FC-CCS) in 
experiment 2 seem to have created the desired level of complexity for the novice learners. In addition to 
the different levels and multiplicity of relationships between a large number of agents, the subjects’ lack of 
prior experience with and knowledge of the environment of the cell added to the cognitive load reported 
by the subjects (Jacobson, 2001; Mayer & Moreno, 1994; Barsalou, 1999; Sweller, 1994). Though 
subjects who learned about the FC-CCS in experiment 2 uniformly reported thinking that additional time 
would not help improve their learning of the material during the first exposure, 100% of them (and largely 





sheer volume of information. Some reported having detected that “there was more to the story” and found 
themselves wanting for more information about the system. Though this subjective observation cannot be 
quantitatively analyzed, it is important to note that the subjects appeared physically less affected by the 
complexity of material during and immediately after the study session when learning about a single 
complex system in experiment 1 than the functionally coupled ones in experiment 2.  
Consistent with the cognitive theory of multimedia learning, subjects reported re-examining text 
and diagram (within medium integration) as well as going back and forth between text and diagram 
(across medium integration) (Hegarty, 1992; Hegarty, Morrison and Just, 1993; Hegarty & Sims, 1994). In 
addition, as indicated by % correct identification of structural, functional, and mechanistic elements in 
Table 15 and 16, subjects appear to have selectively attended to only structural and functional or 
mechanistic details  of the causal complex system (CCS) that were critical in their understanding of the 
overall mechanism by which the system generates the final product (Mayer, 1989a) 
It appears that lack of prior formal or experiential knowledge as well as the low perceptual 
affordance of the biochemical system created considerable challenges to developing mental models of 
such complex system (Barsalou, Solomon, and Wu, 1999; Barsalou, 2008). The subjects often ironically 
recalled the bicycle pump as a “real life” object, while referring to the DNA replication system as “not real 
life”. This was often explained by the fact that many reported having seen and personally worked with a 
bicycle pump before. Moreover, many in the envisioning training groups gestured lowering and pulling up 
the piston (as if the subject was actually using the pump) when recalling their envisioning scenarios to 
confirm the effectiveness of the training intervention. This finding supported the grounded cognition 
theories that assert people use prior sensorimotor experiences to reason about situations in the absence 
of direct access (Barsalou, 2008). The irony is that in the absence of clear (perceptual) experience with 
the content, the vey molecule that gives rise to all life is perceived as difficult to understand as it 
“resembles nothing in real life”. Interestingly, when a so called real life analogy could be found (i.e. zipper, 
weights), the subjects actively used analogical reasoning to supplement their understanding of each 
structure’s functional capacity (Clement, 1988; Collins & Gentner, 1983). For example, the opening of 
zippers, teeth of a zipper matching with a teeth of the old zipper served as an effective functional analog 





molecule by the second system to produce proteins to an assembly line in a factory was the most 
commonly volunteered analogy for FC-CCS used in experiment 2. The subjects also reported 
spontaneous generation of analogies between functions of objects they knew in more familiar domains 
and the molecular components of the DNA replication system (e.g. H Enzyme opening the DNA like a 
zipper, DNA twisting back up like braided hair, SSB proteins attaching like weights to the DNA strands to 
prevent them from moving up to their sister strands, etc.) (Clement, 1988). 
The findings from experiments 1 and 2 suggest that it is possible for novice learners to build 
relatively accurate and sufficiently complete mental models of causal complex systems with a relatively 
short exposure to text and static diagram (Hegarty, Kritz, & Cate, 2003; Mayer, Hegarty, Mayer, & 
Campbell, 2005; Chi & Roscoe, 2002). This study may indeed provide the first example of such learning 
success with such high complexity. Most subjects appeared to have formed effective mental models of 
the systems (100% for CCS, and 87% for FC-CCS) at the macro level (overall function of the system). 
The fragmentations identified in the subjects’ mental models predominantly happen at the micro level 
(mechanism). 
The subjects’ mental models of both CCS and FC-CCS appeared to include both static mental 
images as well as mental animation (Hegarty, Morrison, & Just, 1993; Schwartz & Black, 1996a).  In 
learning about CCS, despite the fact that the diagram presented the system as one continuous frame, the 
subjects appeared to have spontaneously identified at least three different segments of mechanism with 
varied clarity of boundaries between segments: 1) the most clearly defined segment was the beginning 
segment that started with the original parent molecule with two strands, which was split by the H enzyme 
resulting in the replication fork. Most subjects reported this segment to be the most memorable, 
conducive to visualization, or “dramatic” aspect of the entire mechanism of DNA replication.; 2) the 
second segment, with the least defined boundaries included all necessary steps to copy each strand of 
the parent molecule, such that two new molecules each with one old and one new strands are formed; 
and 3) the end stage was identified as the one in which the old and new strands were rewound to form 
the new DNA double helices. The first and last segments were reported to be animated (or envisioned 





(temporal and spatial divergence between the parent strands as they undergo replication) appeared to be 
the least conducive to mental animation or envisioning (Sweller, 1994).  
Similar to findings from previous studies, novice learners’ mental models of both types of causal 
complex systems were highly varied in quality and coherence, ranging from incoherent and incomplete 
(knowledge in fragments) to coherent and (partially) complete (diSessa, 1988; Chi and Roscoe, 2002). 
Consistent with previous findings, subjects appeared to have used piecemeal strategy of mental 
animation as indicated by recalling some and not all parts of the causal chains (Hegarty, 1992; Mayer, 
1989a). Unlike Hegarty’s findings, these steps do not necessarily correspond to the earlier steps in the 
mechanism of the system’s action (when compared to the origin/ referent). Instead, these steps 
correspond directly to the structures and actions most critical to the formation of the system’s end 
product.  
Visual cues within the text (and continuous diagram) appeared to have provided the subjects with 
enough information regarding the novelty of the structures in particular frames despite the fact that all 
molecules are depicted as simple geometric shapes devoid of perceptual templates and or any 
affordance of the functions attributed to them in the text.  This attention is most impressive in the 
distinction many subjects made between the two different types of DNA P enzymes which share 
similarities in name (text) and shape (diagram), but engage in different steps of the mechanism. This 
might be the first line of evidence for people inferring affordances about complex interactions and actors 
with whom they have no prior perceptual experience. As the icons do not represent a perceptual 
experience on which the subjects could ground their understanding, the indexical hypothesis would 
suggest that the functional and relational affordances between various structures in CCS and FC-CCS 
could have only been constructed using analog symbols and icons (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000). 
Post-test interviews suggested that in the absence of explicit instruction and training, people used 
various strategies to form mental models of the CCS and FC-CCS ranging from rereading and 
memorizing (without especial attention to understanding), to partially or fully envisioning processes 
(spontaneously or through strategy training).  Even subjects with most sophisticated mental models 
seemed to leave out a few structural, functional and mechanistic attributes of the causal complex system 





overall function (formation of end products), the results in tables 7, 8, 15, and 16 imply that that novice 
learners choose to attend to details selectively in an effort to effectively cope with the intrinsic cognitive 
load cause by system’s complexity (Sweller, 1994 & Mayer & Moreno, 2003). 
Training novice learners to envision the function of complex systems prior to instruction improved 
their mental models of the complex system. The ability to envision seems to be influenced by the 
cognitive load learners experienced when interacting with the material. Post-test interviews revealed that 
while subjects reported relative ease with animating the unwinding/opening and rewinding the double 
helix (first and last phases of the CCS mechanism), their attempts to visualize the middle segment 
(copying and elongating new strands from parent strands) predominantly resulted in static images similar 
to the ones provided in the instructional handout. Increase in complexity appeared to compromise the 
subjects’ ability to envision by dividing attention (Mayer, 2005). It is noteworthy that when faced with the 
spatially and temporally split middle segment, the majority of subjects seem to have focused on one and 
not both strands and their divergent replication processed (80.5 % of the subjects correctly identified the 
replication of the leading strand, while the correct identification of the lagging strand replication was 
limited to 35.1%).   
Similar to previous findings function-salient text improved the subjects’ mental models of single 
causal complex systems when compared to the structure-salient text when learning about CCS (Liu & 
Hmelo-Silver, 2009). This effect was not observed when learning about FC-CCS. While the interaction 
between the text and strategy training was not significant in learning about CCS, the interaction was 
statistically significant when learning about FC-CCS with the greatest yield for envisioning training being 
associated with the conditions in which the subjects received function-salient texts. It should be noted that 
the difference in structure-salient and function-salient texts was limited to the order in which sentences 
appeared in the document (in an attempt to conserve the content presented to subjects in different 
conditions). This may not sufficiently stress function over form as intended. Additional manipulations of 
text are required to determine the optimal format of presenting textual information about causal complex 
systems to promote mental model development through envisioning.  
As complexity increased, people experienced more difficulty developing casual mental models of 





the system’s overall function (macroloevel), over 10% of the subjects reported faulty macro level mental 
models of the coupled systems, indicating their lack of understanding of the systems’ overall function 
(Jacobson, 2001). Effective macro level mental models may be a key factor in developing more detailed 
mental models of the systems at a micro level. Moreover, difficulty in conceptualizing the causal model 
might have affected the subjects’ ability to envision the process as readily as a single complex system. 
A Note on Removing Subjects Who Reached Early Impasse  
A few subjects claimed not “remembering” enough to answer any post-test questions. Their 
responses were subsequently removed from the analyses (3 and 6 subjects from experiments 1 and 2 
respectively).This decision was made based on the following:  
1) The subjects who reached early impasse were distributed fairly evenly across all experimental 
conditions (tables 8 and 19). As such, their removal was not expected to compromise the equivalency 
between experimental conditions as roughly 1-2 subjects were removed from each experimental 
condition.  
2) Though I did not probe the detailed reasons for claims behind “not remembering” the content 
enough to answer the questions, the subjects mentioned not having ever had the interest to learn 
“science” and were turned off by the subject matter upon arrival. With such subjective reports, it was not 
possible to attribute their early impasse to any actual challenges (quality of instructional material, content 
complexity, or individual differences that would affect their learning). In other words, since I could not 
distinguish between lack of motivation to participate in answering posttest question and poor/no learning 
of the material, I decided to exclude these subjects from the pool to keep the absence of answers/ wrong 
answers limited to the actual gaps in knowledge/ misconceptions by the ones who reported having 





The studies reviewed in this document have several limitations discussed below. 
 
Gender 
 Given the small ratio of male to female participants in the studies performed, the influence of 
gender on construction of mental models of causal complex systems was not investigated. Additional 





well as factors that potentially mediate the effects of gender (i.e. differences in spatial or systemizing 
abilities).  
Envisioning Strategy Training Manipulation 
As previously mentioned in this document, the subjects were provided with a small paragraph of 
text describing the process by which they could qualitatively simulate the systems’ overall functions. To 
help define elements that define envisioning, the subjects were provided with a distinction between 
structural and functional elements of the systems, which they were invited to examine to help build causal 
models of the systems before qualitatively simulating them. Having reviewed the experimental sessions 
(observational anecdotes as well as interview transcripts), it appears that the subjects focused on the 
very last part of the instructions to envision, the prompt to “animate” the system, or “make a movie” of the 
system in their minds’ eyes rather than focusing on the distinctions between structure and function. It is, 
however possible that making the distinction between structure and function explicit in the strategy 
training manipulation provided another layer of attending to function over structure to those who received 
training to envision. For future experiments, I intend to considerably truncate the training instructions to 
simply allude to “running a movie of the system” without any specific mentions of structural, functional, or 
mechanistic elements.  
Effect(s) of Increase in Complexity  
 Ultimately, the effects of increase in complexity could be best studied using a within-subject 
design in which variations in individual subject differences and experimental settings could be held 
constant. Since no statistical comparisons were made between the findings from experiments 1 and 2, no 
quantitative inferences can be made about the impact of increasing the system complexity. A setting in 
which subjects are guaranteed to return for the second experiment after a period of cognitive break (i.e. 
students enrolled in a science classroom) to learn about the two systems in two consecutive experimental 




Grounded Cognition in Learning about Complexity 
  
The qualitative findings from experiments conducted in this document indicated that people 





challenge in learning about it. Given the microscopic nature of the environments in which many natural 
systems operate, the speed with which biochemical reactions take place, and the indistinct way different 
molecules appear under various forms of microscopy, it is unlikely that a real life exercise can be 
constructed to provide perceptual or embodied experience for the novice learners. Plastic models or 
animations have been successfully used to teach novice learners about molecular structures and 
interactions in chemistry education for many a decade. Still, it is difficult to use such models to walk the 
learners through navigating the causal relationships between individual models using animation or plastic 
models when addressing such high level of complexity. Direct manipulation animation (DMA) which 
includes haptic modality might be a useful solution in learning about at least a few aspects of the complex 
systems in this document (Chan & Black, 2006). For example, the effect of DMA can be compared to 
static text and diagrams to learn about how helicase breaks apart the different DNA strands or how the 
topoisomerases relieve the torsional strain on the molecule (subject feeling the physical force though 
haptic channels). Still, more creative solutions are required to aid the learners in keeping track of and 
perceiving temporal and spatial elements that add to the complexity of the causal systems.    
 
Optimizing the Instructional Stimuli 
  
As previously stated, all studies (including the two described in this document) that have 
compared function v. structure salience in text have done so by merely changing the order of information 
presentation (top down v. bottom up).  This potentially underestimates the context that might be required 
to promote understanding of function over form. A potential solution may be to study the additive effect of 
organizing the text that describes the content to be function salient (v. structure-salient), while at the 
same time using Youm’s (2010) approach to provide the subjects with training to help them distinguish 
between causal and functional relationships and local functions from the overall complex systems’ 
functions (the formation of end products). The SfMF framework in other words, can be articulated as a 
learning framework as well a scoring rubric for causal complex systems.  
Cognitive Load and Complexity 
While the experiments in this document did not focus on cognitive load as a variable, the findings 
in this document provided clear and additional evidence for intrinsic (difficulty of processing inherent in 





mental work required by the learner to encode the complex material) dimensions of cognitive load 
(Sweller, 1994; Sweller, 2010).  Sweller (2010) defines intrinsic cognitive load in the excerpt below: 
  
The level of intrinsic cognitive load for a particular task and knowledge level is assumed 
to be determined by the level of element interactivity. An element is anything that needs 
to be or has been learned, such as a concept or a procedure. Low element interactivity 
materials allow individual elements to be learned with minimal reference to other 
elements and so impose a low working memory load. … Because they can be learned 
independently, working memory need only process the cognitive elements associated 
with the symbol for copper without the load associated with the symbol for iron. High 
element interactivity material consists of elements that heavily interact and so cannot be 
learned in isolation. The more elements that interact, the heavier the working memory 
load. 
 
The intrinsic cognitive load as defined by interactivity between elements has been somewhat alluded to in 
this document. In other words, the two-fold increase in the number of structures and causal relationships 
between them from CCS to FC-CCS can be used to measure the increase in intrinsic cognitive load. The 
germane cognitive load defined as “the working memory resources that the learner devoted to dealing 
with the intrinsic cognitive load associated with the information”, however, was observed, but not 
adequately measured or reported. As previously mentioned, the subjects in experiment 2 demonstrated 
(and spontaneously reported) more signs of physical stress in the 60 minutes during which they learned 
about and took the post-test on FC-CCS than the subjects who learned about CCS in experiment 1 (and 
reported it without being prompted). This provides an opportunity for future research on operationalizing 
and quantifying germane cognitive load learners experience when learning about complex systems in 
science education.  One of the reasons to use visuospatial indices as covariates was to determine 
whether individual differences in learner characteristics (such as the ones in visuospatial ability) could 
shed some light on the amount of germane cognitive load different learners would experience when 
learning about such high complexity.  Though the two particular indices used in this document failed to 
provide additional information on the topic, investigation of additional differences in individual learner 




While admitting to bias (interest and experience in science education), I could not find a more 





this document than to end by an unsolicited utterance volunteered by subject 69 in experiment 1, who 
received envisioning training as well a function-salient text to learn about DNA replication:  
 
I cannot believe how easy this was to do. Once I closed my eyes and saw it happen, I got 
it. I didn’t need to read it over and over again, like I am used to doing with science. I got it 
the first time. And once I got it, it was in my head. I didn’t have to look at it again. And it 
was a really cool thing to learn about. I would probably become a science major if I had 
thought of doing this in my science classes.  
 
Not all novice learners felt (or reported) such transformation in their choice of strategies to learn 
about causal complex systems nor choice of academic pursuits as a result of a simple educational 
intervention. Still, it is worth noting that given our decades-long challenge in attracting students to STEM 
majors and given the obvious necessity of educating our students on progressively larger body of 
information on various dimensions of complexity, experiments such as the ones described in this 
document can help inform best instructional practices (e.g.. manipulations of instructional media or 
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DNA is a polymer, a large biological molecule, comprised of building blocks called nucleotides. Each 
nucleotide in turn is made out of three different components, a nitrogenous base, a phosphate group, and 
a sugar called ribose. The sugar and phosphate alternate (sugar-phosphate-sugar-phosphate, etc.) to 
form the strands (backbone of the molecule). The middle of the molecule, which resembles the rungs of a 
ladder include the nitrogenous bases. Four such bases are possible: Adenine (A); Cytosine (C); Guanine 
(G); and Thymine (T). Notice that DNA has two strands that twist around each other (Double helix). As 
such, adenine on one strand always binds to thymine on the other strand, while the guanine on one 
strand always binds to the cytosine of the other strand.  
 








APPENDIX B: DNA REPLICATION HANDOUT (STRUCTURE-SALIENT VERSION) 
 
DNA is made of four possible building blocks, called nucleotides. Each nucleotide is made from 
three different components: a nitrogenous base; a sugar molecule; and a phosphate group.  The 
nitrogenous bases of the DNA are of four different types: Adenine (A); Guanine (G); Cytosine (C); and 
Thymine (T). In all DNA molecules, A from one strand always pairs with T from the other strand. Similarly, 
G from one strand binds C from the other strand. 
The origin(s) of replication on the DNA molecule mark the spot from which the replication process 
begins. The H enzyme unwinds the double helix and pulls the two strands apart at specific locations by 
breaking the chemical bonds between two complementary strands forming a replication fork. 
The SSB proteins bind the single strands of DNA to prevent the nucleotides from rejoining the 
complementary nucleotides on the opposite strands.  
The T enzyme cuts the DNA strands following the unwinding by the H enzyme to help relieve the strand 
supercoiling. 
The RNAP enzyme lays down a small stretch of the DNA chemical cousin (RNA) at specific sites 
on the single DNA strands to mark the beginning of the process. 
 
The DNAP3 enzyme adds nucleotides to the RNA stretch by matching new nucleotides to the nucleotides 
on the parent DNA strand (i.e. bringing As to match Ts on the parent strands). One of the strands will be 
replicated continuously (the leading strand), while the other will be replicated in smaller fragments (the 
lagging strand). 
As single parent strands match the developing strands, the SSB proteins come off the single 
strands. Once the new strands have been replicated, the RNAH enzyme cuts out the early RNA stretch 
from the newly produced DNA strand. The DNA P1 enzyme replaces the RNA stretches with DNA 
nucleotides complementary to the parent strands.  The L enzyme connects the smaller pieces of DNA to 
form long strands. 
 
The complementary strand twist around each other to form the DNA double helix. 
To conserve instructions for life (genetic information) between the parent and offspring generations, DNA 
is replicated via a semi-conservative process by which newly produced DNA molecules comprise of one 
















APPENDIX C: DNA REPLICATION HANDOUT (FUNCTION-SALIENT VERSION) 
 
To conserve instructions for life (genetic information) between the parent and offspring generations, DNA 
is replicated via a semi-conservative process by which newly produced DNA molecules comprise of one 
parent and one new strands.  
The origin(s) of replication on the DNA molecule mark the spot from which the replication process begins. 
The H enzyme unwinds the double helix and pulls the two strands apart at specific locations by breaking 
the chemical bonds between two complementary strands forming a replication fork. 
DNA is made of four possible building blocks, called nucleotides. Each nucleotide is made from three 
different components: a nitrogenous base; a sugar molecule; and a phosphate group.  The nitrogenous 
bases of the DNA are of four different types: Adenine (A); Guanine (G); Cytosine (C); and Thymine (T). In 
all DNA molecules, A from one strand always pairs with T from the other strand. Similarly, G from one 
strand binds C from the other strand. 
 The SSB proteins bind the single strands of DNA to prevent the nucleotides from rejoining the 
complementary nucleotides on the opposite strands.  
The T enzyme cuts the DNA strands following the unwinding by the H enzyme to help relieve the strand 
supercoiling. 
The RNAP enzyme lays down a small stretch of the DNA chemical cousin (RNA) at specific sites on the 
single DNA strands to mark the beginning of the process. 
The DNAP3 enzyme adds nucleotides to the RNA stretch by matching new nucleotides to the nucleotides 
on the parent DNA strand (i.e. bringing As to match Ts on the parent strands). One of the strands will be 
replicated continuously (the leading strand), while the other will be replicated in smaller fragments (the 
lagging strand). 
As single parent strands match the developing strands, the SSB proteins come off the single strands. 
Once the new strands have been replicated, the RNAH enzyme cuts out the early RNA stretch from the 
newly produced DNA strand.  
The DNA P1 enzyme replaces the RNA stretches with DNA nucleotides complementary to the parent 
strands.   
The L enzyme connects the smaller pieces of DNA to form long strands. 
















APPENDIX D: PRE/POST-TEST EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Subject #:      Date: 
 
1. What is the purpose of the system you just learned about? 







2. In the space below please draw and label as many structures as you can remember. How does 
each structure you have identified work to achieve the system’s function? 
14 structure, 13 local functions (of individual structures), 11 sequential steps, and 1 overall 
system Function (total points (mental model score) = 39) 
 
 
3. Suppose an environmental toxin damages the DNA nucleotides in a developing embryo, inserting 
a T every time the system is expected to insert a C. How will the developing embryo (who is 
undergoing rapid cell division) be affected by this structural change? 







4. DNAP enzyme has a proofreading function. If it should insert a wrong nucleotide as it copies the 
DNA, it is usually able to go back and replace it with a correct one. Suppose an error in DNAP 
function prevents the enzyme from proofreading. What do you predict will happen to the newly 
produced DNA? 









APPENDIX E: SCORING RUBRIC EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 
Structural components (1 point per correctly stated structure) 
1. The origin of replication 
2. RNA primase (RNA P) 
3. RNA primer (Primer) 
4. Single Stranded binding proteins (SSB) 
5. Nucleotides 
6. Helicase (H Enzyme) 
7. Replication fork 
8. Topoisomerase (T Enzyme) 
9. Lagging strand 
10. Leading strand 
11. DNA Polymerase II (DNA P1) 
12. DNA Polymerase III (DNA P3) 
13. Ligase (L Enzyme) 
14. RNA H Enzyme 
 
Functional Components (1 point per correctly stated function) 
1. RNA primase 
2. RNA primer 
3. Single Stranded binding proteins 
4. Base pairing between adenine and thymine 
5. Base pairing between guanine and cytosine 
6. Helicase 
7. Topoisomerase 
8. Lagging strand  
9. Leading strand 
10. DNA Polymerase II 
11. DNA Polymerase II 
12. Ligase 
13. RNA H Enzyme 
 
Mechanistic Components (1 point per correctly stated step) 
1. Identification of the origin of replication  
2. Separation of strands by helicase 
3. Nicking of the DNA by topoisomerase 
4. Anchoring of single strands by the single stranded binding proteins 
5. Formation of the RNA primer by RNA primase to mark the spot for the start of replication 
6. Continuous replication of the leading strand by DNA Polymerase III complementary base pairing 
7. Fragmented replication of the lagging strand by DNA Polymerase III complementary base pairing 
8. Removal of the RNA primers by RNA H 
9. Replacement of the RNA primers by DNA Polymerase II 
10. Joining the lagging strand fragments via ligase 








APPENDIX F: FUNCTION-SALIENT STIMULUS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
RNA TRANSCRIPTION AND PROTEIN TRANSLATION 
 
The chemical instructions for all life functions in living organisms are contained within the DNA.  
DNA contains many smaller functional units called genes that code for proteins which carry out DNA 
instructions in cells. For example, in humans the insulin gene codes for the insulin protein, which 
facilitates the absorption of sugar into cells. 
While the DNA remains in the cell nucleus at all times to be protected from cellular damage, the 
proteins must be produced on the surface of the ribosomes located in the cytoplasm. To that end, the 
production of proteins takes place in two-steps: 1) the DNA instructions are transcribed into a messenger 
RNA (a lighter, single stranded chemical cousin of DNA), which is transported into the cytoplasm 
(transcription system); and 2) the messenger RNA is translated into a protein (the translation system). 
Please note that the rest of this document uses “gene” and “DNA” interchangeably. The gene is a specific 
sequence of the entire DNA. 
Gene transcription happens in three phases. During the initiation phase, the RNA P enzyme 
recognizes and binds the promoter region of the template DNA strand of the specific gene. The RNA P 
enzyme then unwinds and separates the DNA strands to allow better access to the specific sequence of 
DNA that contains the gene to be transcribed. During the elongation phase, the RNA P reads and 
transcribes the DNA message by inserting nucleotides complementary to the DNA nucleotides (i.e. an A 
on the RNA transcript for every T on the DNA, a G on the RNA transcript for every C on the DNA, a U on 
the RNA transcript for every A on the DNA, and a C on the RNA transcript for every G on the DNA). Once 
the entire gene has been read and transcribed, the termination phase begins during which various 





At this point the RNA transcript contains regions that code for a specific protein (exons) and regions that 
do NOT code for any proteins (introns). Before the transcript can be transported into the cytoplasm, it has 
to be further modified- the introns must be removed through splicing such that the final product 
(messenger RNA) only contains exons that code for a protein. Having undergone splicing, the messenger 
RNA moves into the cytoplasm.  
 
The messenger RNA is made of three-letter codes (codons), which correspond to code for individual 
amino acids that make up the building blocks for proteins.  Another type of RNA (T) helps the ribosome 






amino acids that correspond to the codon to the ribosome. T’s have anti-codon regions that are 
complementary to the sequence of codons on the messenger RNA, which helps T’s recognize and bind to 




The translation of messenger RNA happens in three phases. The initiation phase begins with the 
formation of an initiation complex on the messenger RNA. Once the initiation complex is formed, the large 
ribosomal subunit binds to this complex. At this time, the T carrying the starter amino acid moves to the P 





codon then moves in to the A site on the ribosome, which monitors the T anticodon binding to the 



























APPENDIX G: STRUCTURE-SALIENT STIMULUS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
RNA TRANSCRIPTION AND PROTEIN TRANSLATION 
 
Gene transcription happens in three phases. During the initiation phase, the RNA P enzyme 
recognizes and binds the promoter region of the template DNA strand of the specific gene. The RNA P 
enzyme then unwinds and separates the DNA strands to allow better access to the specific sequence of 
DNA that contains the gene to be transcribed. During the elongation phase, the RNA P reads and 
transcribes the DNA message by inserting nucleotides complementary to the DNA nucleotides (i.e. an A 
on the RNA transcript for every T on the DNA, a G on the RNA transcript for every C on the DNA, a U on 
the RNA transcript for every A on the DNA, and a C on the RNA transcript for every G on the DNA). Once 
the entire gene has been read and transcribed, the termination phase begins during which various 
molecule signal the end of the process and the transcript is separated from the DNA sequence.  
 
 
The RNA transcript contains regions that code for a specific protein (exons) and regions that do NOT 
code for any proteins (introns). Before the transcript can be transported into the cytoplasm, it has to be 
further modified- the introns must be removed through splicing such that the final product (messenger 
RNA) only contains exons that code for a protein. Having undergone splicing, the messenger RNA moves 
into the cytoplasm.  
 
The messenger RNA is made of three-letter codes (codons), which correspond to code for individual 
amino acids that make up the building blocks for proteins.  Another type of RNA (T) helps the ribosome 
(the site of protein production) with reading the messenger RNA codons and transferring the specific 
amino acids that correspond to the codon to the ribosome. T’s have anti-codon regions that are 
complementary to the sequence of codons on the messenger RNA, which helps T’s recognize and bind to 








The translation of messenger RNA happens in three phases. The initiation phase begins with the 
formation of an initiation complex on the messenger RNA. Once the initiation complex is formed, the large 
ribosomal subunit binds to this complex. At this time, the T carrying the starter amino acid moves to the P 
site on the large ribosome. The T carrying the amino acid corresponding to the first messenger RNA 
codon then moves in to the A site on the ribosome, which monitors the T anticodon binding to the 








The chemical instructions for all life functions in living organisms are contained within the DNA.  DNA 
contains many smaller functional units called genes that code for proteins which carry out DNA 
instructions in cells. For example, in humans the insulin gene codes for the insulin protein, which 
facilitates the absorption of sugar into cells. While the DNA remains in the cell nucleus at all times to be 
protected from cellular damage, the proteins must be produced on the surface of the ribosomes located in 
the cytoplasm. To that end, the production of proteins takes place in two-steps: 1) the DNA instructions 
are transcribed into a messenger RNA (a lighter, single stranded chemical cousin of DNA), which is 
transported into the cytoplasm (transcription system); and 2) the messenger RNA is translated into a 
protein (the translation system).Please note that throughout this document uses “gene” and “DNA” were 
used interchangeably. The gene is a specific sequence of the entire DNA.  





APPENDIX H: PRE/POST-TEST EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
Subject: _________ Date: __________ 
 
1. What is the overall purpose of the transcription and translation systems? 
(0= incorrect answer; 1= correct answer; total points=1) 
 
 
2. In a step by step fashion, using text and diagram, please use the space below to describe the 
process by which these systems achieve their product.  
25 structure, 24 local functions (of individual structures), 19 sequential steps, and 1 overall 






3. How could a mutation in the insulin gene affect the production of the insulin protein? 
(0= incorrect answer; 1= correct answer; total points=1) 
 
 
4. Suppose the A site makes a mistake in checking for the codon-anticodon compatibility. How 
would protein production be affected? 






APPENDIX I: SCORING RUBRIC EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Structural Components (1 point per correctly stated structure) 
 
System 1: Transcription 
1. DNA double helix 
2. RNA P enzyme 
3. Promoter 
4. Nucleotides 
5. Transcription termination assembly 
6. Introns 
7. Exons 





System 2: Translation 




15. Small subunit of ribosome 
16. Large subunit of ribosome 
17. E site 
18. A site 
19. P site                                                                                                                                                                                                     
20. Starter amino acid 
21. UAG codon 
22. Other amino acids 
23. Transfer RNA 
24. Ribosome/tRNA/mRNA assembly 
25. Stop codon 
 
 
Functional Components (1 point per correctly stated function) 
 
System 1: Transcription 
1. DNA double helix 
2. RNA P enzyme 
3. Promoter 
4. Base pairing between A and U 
5. Base pairing between C and G 
6. Transcription termination assembly 
7. Introns 
8. Exons 
9. Messenger RNA 
 
 
System 2: Translation 




14. Small subunit of ribosome 





16. E site 
17. A site 
18. P site 
19. Starter amino acid 
20. UAG codon 
21. Other amino acids 
22. Transfer RNA 
23. Ribosome/tRNA/mRNA assembly 
24. Stop codon 
 
 
Mechanistic Components (1 point per correctly stated step in the mechanism) 
 
System 1: Transcription 
1. RNAP binds the promoter on the DNA in the cell nucleus. 
2. RNAP unwinds DNA and separates it to transcribe it. 
3. Using complementary base pairing, RNAP transcribes DNA. 
4. A series of molecules signal the termination of transcription. 
5. Transcript separates. 
6. The RNA product will undergo splicing (introns are removed) to produce messenger RNA. 
7. mRNA moves to the cytoplasm. 
 
System 2: Translation 
8. Initiation complex is formed on the mRNA.  
9. Large subunit of ribosome binds the initiation complex. 
10. tRNA carrying starter amino acids enter P site. 
11. Second tRNA with second amino acid enters A site. 
12. Codon-anticodon match takes place. 
13. A peptide bond is formed between the started and second amino acid. 
14. Ribosome moves along mRNA 
15. Empty tRNA moves into E site. 
16. Empty tRNA leaves the ribosome. 
17. The process repeats. 
18. Stop codon is reached. 







APPENDIX J: EXPERIMENT 1 ANALYSES 
DISTRIBUTION OF DATA BY MENTAL MODEL (SUB) SCORE BY CONDITION 
 
A= Function- salient text+ Envisioning Training; B= Function-salient text + NO Envisioning Training 





























Initial Model Univariate Analysis of Variance Using Text Organization and Envisioning Training as 
Factors and Shape Memory and Paper Folding Scores as Covariates and the Mental Model 
Complexity Score of CCS as the Dependent Variable 
 
 
Mental Model Complexity Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores Function-Salient Text (F) 
 
Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy Training(Y) 27.40 
 
25.6 26.5 
No Strategy Training (N) 24.5 
 
20.9 22.7 
Total 25.9 23.2 24.6 
 
Overall Model: F= 3.46, p=0.008 Shape Memory F= 0.993, p=0.323 
Paper Folding F= 4.00, p=0.050  Strategy Training F= 7.48, p=0.008 


























Initial Model Multivariate Analysis of Variance Using Text Organization and Envisioning Training 
as Factors and Shape Memory and Paper Folding Scores as Covariates and the structure, 
function, and mechanism subscores for CCS as the Dependent Variables 
 
Experiment 1 Structure Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores Function-Salient Text (F) 
 
Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy training (Y) 10.63 
 
10.05 10.34 







Experiment 1 Function Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores Function-Salient Text (F) 
 
Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy training (Y) 9.05 
 
8.26 8.66 







Experiment 1 Mechanism Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores 
 
Function-Salient Text (F) Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy training (Y) 
 
6.74 6.00 6.37 
No Strategy training (N) 
 
5.50 4.39 4.97 
Total 6.10 5.21 5.66 
 
Shape Memory: Wilks’ Lambda= 0.915; F= 2.108; p=0.107 
Paper Folding: Wilks’ Lambda= 0.925; F= 1.825; p=0.151 
Strategy Training: Wilks’ Lambda= 0.892; F=2.733; p=0.50 
Text Organization: Wilk’s Lambda= 0.945; F=1.317; p=0.276 























APPENDIX K: EXPERIMENT 2 ANALYSES 
 
Data Distribution 
A= Function- salient text+ Envisioning Training; B= Function-salient text + NO Envisioning Training 






























Initial Model Univariate Analysis of Variance Using Text Organization and Envisioning Training as 
Factors and Shape Memory and Paper Folding Scores as Covariates and the Mental Model 
Complexity Score of FC-CCS as the Dependent Variable 
 
Table 12: Experiment 2 Mental Model Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores 
 
Function-Salient Text (F) Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy Training (Y) 30.4 
 
25.2 25.2 
No Strategy Training (N) 20.9 
 
22.8 22.8 

























Initial Model Multivariate Analysis of Variance Using Text Organization and Envisioning Training 
as Factors and Shape Memory and Paper Folding Scores as Covariates and the Mental Model 
Complexity Score of FC-CCS as the Dependent Variable 
 
Experiment 2 Structure Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores Function-Salient Text (F) 
 
Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy training (Y) 11.8 
 
11.5 11.82 
No Strategy training (N) 9.10 
 
10.9 9.91 
Total 11.1 10.56 10.87 
 
Experiment 2 function Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores Function-Salient Text (F) 
 
Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy training (Y) 9.30 
 
6.22 7.36 
No Strategy training (N) 5.00 
 
5.90 5.59 
Total 7.02 5.92 6.47 
 
Experiment 2 Mechanism Score Marginal Means 
Mean Scores Function-Salient Text (F) 
 
Structure-Salient Text (S) Total 
Strategy training (Y) 8.89 
 
6.92 7.91 
No Strategy training (N) 4.80 
 
6.10 5.34 
Total 6.80 6.46 6.63 
 
Strategy Training: Wilks’ Lambda= 0.825; F= 4.68, p= 0.005; Text Organization and Strategy Training* 
Text Organization: not significant 
Effect of strategy training on structure subscore (F= 6.54, p=0.013), function subscore (F= 5.083, 
p=0.027), and mechanism subscore (F=13.02, p=0.001).  
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